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ABSTRACT 
Essay 1 
In this paper I model the optimal monitoring and enforcement strategy when inspection 
capacity is fixed by budget or manpower constraints. I adopt a leverage enforcement 
structure that classifies firms into two groups with different enforcement intensities. 
Optimal monitoring and enforcement requires effective allocation of the fixed number of 
inspections to the two groups. In each period, a fixed number of firms are selected from 
each group for inspection, and those with the highest emissions are placed in the targeted 
group in which the inspection probability is higher. This transition structure induces rank-
order tournaments among inspected firms. Once selected for inspection, the emissions of 
each firm are subject to a standard above which the firm pays a fixed penalty. I find that a 
regulator facing inspection capacity constraints should leverage the limited inspections by 
allocating more inspections to the targeted group. In addition, I show that targeting 
enforcement is generally superior to static enforcement. This is in accordance with 
findings in the literature. These results are consistent over different ranges of regulatory 
parameters.  
 
Essay 2 
We model the optimal design of programs requiring firms to disclose harmful emissions 
when disclosure yields both direct and indirect benefits. The indirect benefit arises from 
the internalization of social costs and resulting reduction in emissions. The direct benefit 
results from the disclosure of previously private information which is valuable to 
potentially harmed parties. Previous theoretical and empirical analyses of such programs 
restrict attention to the former benefit while the stated motivation for such programs 
highlights the latter benefit. When disclosure yields both direct and indirect benefits, 
policymakers face a tradeoff between inducing truthful self-reporting and deterring 
emissions. Internalizing the social costs of emissions, such as through a Pigovian tax, will 
deter emissions, but may also reduce incentives for firms to truthfully report their 
emissions.  
 
Essay 3 
This paper investigates the compliance behavior of firms simultaneously regulated under 
multiple environmental programs. Three possible relationships among regulatory 
programs are considered: complementarity, substitution and independence. I develop a 
theoretical model of firm decision making that shows the potential for interrelationships 
among regulations.  I propose an indirect test of the theoretical results and implement the 
empirical model using data on compliance with Resource Conservation and Recovery 
Act (RCRA) for facilities in Michigan that are regulated under both RCRA and Clean Air 
Act (CAA). Results show evidence of positive cross program effects such that an increase 
in measures of CAA enforcement intensity lead to increased firm compliance with 
RCRA; the empirical results are consistent with a complementary relationship between 
the two programs. Thus coordination is required for optimal monitoring and enforcement 
strategies.  
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CHAPTER I GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
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Facing constrained budgets, a regulator is not able to monitor every firm and 
enforce compliance continuously. Incomplete enforcement means it is necessary to 
optimally allocate the limited resources for monitoring and enforcement. Information 
disclosure programs or other enforcement strategies such as targeting may help reduce 
enforcement costs. The first two chapters of my dissertation address the above regulation 
issues under incomplete enforcement. In addition, the enforcement of various 
environmental programs may also interact for the same regulated firms such that the 
enforcement of one program have positive, negative or zero spillover effects on firm 
compliance with other programs. The third chapter endeavors to uncover and determine 
the nature of the spillover effects by inspecting facilities regulated under multiple 
programs.  
 The first essay addresses optimal environmental regulation with fixed inspection 
capacity. I adopt the leverage enforcement structure that classifies firms into two groups 
with different inspection probabilities. Previous literature on leverage enforcement 
assumes that the inspection probability of one firm is independent of that of another firm. 
This assumption can no longer hold if the number of inspections in each period is fixed. 
My goal is to model a regulator’s policy choice as optimally allocating the fixed number 
of inspections in the two groups. It is shown that allocating more inspections in the 
targeted group is generally optimal. This result is consistent across different ranges of 
enforcement parameters, such as the number of inspections, the penalty for violation, the 
fixed inspection costs, and the standard. In addition, I show that targeting enforcement is 
generally superior to the static enforcement where inspections are randomly allocated 
across all firms. This conclusion is in accordance with previous literature. 
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 The second essay is a joint work with Drs. Mary Evans and Scott Gilpatric. We 
analyze the benefits of information disclosure programs when there are competing 
regulatory objectives: deterring emissions and inducing truthful reporting. While the 
deterrent effects of such programs have been explored extensively, the direct benefits of 
information disclosure remain unexplored. Emissions revealed through self-reporting 
requirements are less damaging to the society than those undisclosed because impacted 
parties can take precautionary and mitigating actions. Our goal is to justify and model 
these direct benefits of self-reporting in social welfare analysis and investigate the 
optimal regulatory parameters. In this paper, we model the optimal design of regulatory 
policies that requires firms to self-report emissions when disclosure yields both direct and 
indirect benefits. The regulator chooses the environmental tax and the probability that a 
firm will be audited to minimize the social cost of emissions. In this context 
policymakers face a tradeoff between inducing truthful reports and deterring emissions. 
Levying a heavy environmental tax helps deter excess emissions but also create 
incentives for the firm to reduce reporting to evade taxes. 
 In the third essay, I investigate firm compliance when it is regulated under 
multiple environmental programs. The externalities that one program imposes on other 
programs can be positive, negative or zero. Based on a theoretical model developed in the 
paper, I indirectly test the existence and nature of the spillover effects for facilities in 
Michigan that are regulated under both the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act 
(RCRA) and Clean Air Act (CAA). Empirical results show evidence of positive cross-
program effects such that an increase in measures of CAA enforcement intensity lead to 
increased firm compliance with RCRA; the empirical results are consistent with a 
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complementary relationship between the two programs. In addition, it is confirmed that 
enforcement actions exert positive effects on compliance within the same program.  
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CHAPTER II ESSAY 1: CONTROLLING POLLUTION WITH FIXED 
INSPECTION CAPACITY 
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1.1 Introduction 
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is responsible for implementing 
environmental regulations in the United States. It has ten regional offices, each of which, 
cooperating with the states, performs inspections to enforce compliance with 
environmental laws and regulations within its responsible areas. However, constrained 
fiscal budgets and limited workforce make it impossible for the EPA and the states to 
inspect all polluting firms every year. In this paper, I consider a dynamic model of 
monitoring and enforcement in which a regulator faces fixed inspection capacity. The 
regulator’s objective is to determine the enforcement strategy that achieves the optimal 
abatement effort levels of firms. I adopt the leverage enforcement structure, also known 
as state-dependent enforcement or targeting enforcement, that classifies firms into two 
groups with different enforcement intensities. It has been shown that leverage 
enforcement is superior to static enforcement in terms of firm compliance or emission 
levels under certain conditions (see Harrington, 1988; and Harford, 1991).1 In my model, 
optimal enforcement requires effectively allocating these inspections to the two groups. 
According to Enforcement and Compliance History Online (ECHO) data,2 only 
about 40% of the firms registered with hazardous waste management programs in EPA 
Region 43 were inspected at least once from September 2006 to August 2007. The ECHO 
data also reveal that during the same period, about half and 3/4 of firms in EPA Region 4 
registered with air programs and water programs, respectively, were inspected at least 
                                                 
1 These conditions include: (a) there is no asymmetric information; (b) the desired compliance rate is not 
extremely high; (c) firms are homogeneous in their abatement cost.  
2 The data can be found at http://www.epa-echo.gov/echo/. 
3 EPA Region 4 includes Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Mississippi, North Carolina, South 
Carolina, and Tennessee. 
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once. The inspection capacity constraints give rise to incomplete enforcement. In such 
circumstances, it is crucial that the limited monitoring and enforcement resources are 
optimally allocated. The 2004 Strategy Plan of Region 4 states, “the vast number of 
regulated facilities in the region dictates that Region 4 prioritize where we devote our 
limited resources…the region has far more areas of critical concern than resources” 
(chapter 2, goal 5, p. 1). Therefore, I propose that a targeting enforcement strategy should 
be considered as a means of allocating the fixed number of inspections. 
The targeting model of income tax enforcement was first introduced into the 
environmental regulation literature by Harrington (1988). In his model, firms are placed 
into two groups according to their compliance status. The inspection probabilities and 
sanctions are higher in the targeted group than those in the other group. Firms in the non-
targeted group will be placed in the targeted group if they are found in violation, and 
cannot move back until they are found in compliance. Harrington shows that the leverage 
between groups leads to partial compliance from firms that would have no incentive to 
comply otherwise. Russell (1990) considers a similar model in the presence of 
measurement errors. He concludes that a three-group model provides savings on 
enforcement costs even with imperfect monitoring. Using a more general social objective 
function, Harford (1991) shows that the addition of differentiated pollution standards 
yields lower social costs. More recently, Friesen (2003) suggests that moving firms 
randomly into the targeted group may further reduce monitoring costs. Other issues that 
are addressed within the framework of targeting enforcement include asymmetric 
information (Raymond, 1999), limitations on the superiority of state-dependent 
  8
monitoring (Harford and Harrington, 1991), and self-reporting (Hentschel and Randall, 
2000). 
The targeting models mentioned above share one common feature—the regulator’s 
enforcement strategy simplifies to the regulation of one representative firm with the 
consequence that the inspection probability of one firm is independent of that of another 
firm. This simplification cannot hold for a regulator facing fiscal or manpower 
constraints. For example, when the majority of firms end up in the targeted group, it is 
impossible for the regulator to target all these firms. When few firms are in the targeted 
group, having enforcement resources idle is neither efficient nor desirable from the 
regulator’s viewpoint. The fluctuations in the regulator’s enforcement costs stem from the 
assumption that the sizes of the groups vary while the inspection probabilities in the two 
groups are fixed. Thus the actual total number of inspections needed differs from one 
period to the next. I depart from the previous literature and assume that the number of 
inspections is fixed in any given period. By appropriately allocating the fixed number of 
inspections, the regulator targets firms in one of the groups with a higher inspection 
probability. Under such a targeting enforcement scheme, I investigate the optimal 
leverage of the fixed number of inspections. 
To ensure fixed group sizes, the number of firms inspected in each group in the 
current period should be equal to the number of firms placed in that group in the next 
period. Making a firm’s transition probability from one group to the other dependent 
upon its compliance status no longer satisfies that requirement. Thus I assume the 
inspected firms compete with each other for the chance of being placed in the non-
targeted group. Of all inspected firms, if m of them are selected from the targeted group, 
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then the m  firms with the highest emissions in the current period are placed in the 
targeted group in the next period.  
The structure of this transition process induces rank-order tournaments among 
inspected firms. Tournament models have been widely used in the study of labor 
economics and other related fields since the pioneering work by Lazear and Rosen 
(1981).4 The tournaments induce competition among firms for the chance of being placed 
in the non-targeted group, and this competition may give firms an extra incentive to 
reduce emissions beyond those induced by enforcing the emission standard alone. This 
feature differs from other leverage enforcement models where firms do not interact with 
each other. In other models, the transition probability of a firm is determined solely by its 
own compliance status. In my model, whether a firm switches from one group to the 
other depends on the environmental performance of all the inspected firms. Even though 
a firm is in compliance, it may still be put in the targeted group if its emissions are above 
enough other firms’ emissions.  
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 1.2, I develop a theoretical model 
of firm behavior and a regulator’s targeting enforcement strategies. I derive the optimal 
choices of abatement effort for individual firms in each group and discuss the regulator’s 
enforcement objective—determining the optimal allocation of inspections to each group. 
Since the choice variables for the regulator can only be integers, the traditional first order 
conditions cannot be used to generalize the optimal enforcement strategy. Theoretically 
comparing the results from all possible inspection allocations and group sizes can be used 
                                                 
4 The applications of tournament models in environmental economics are quite limited. See Govindasamy, 
Herriges, and Shogren (1994), and Franckx, D’Amato and Brose (2004) for examples. 
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to determine the optimal enforcement strategy. However, the complexity of the model 
makes it impossible to find a general solution for the purpose of comparison. Therefore, I 
use simulations to establish the patterns of the optimal enforcement strategy in Section 
1.3. Concluding comments are given in Section 1.4. 
The main result of the model is that a regulator facing constrained monitoring 
budgets or manpower should leverage the limited inspections and allocate more 
inspections to the targeted group than to the non-targeted group. However, maximum 
leverage by allocating all but one inspection to the targeted group does not necessary lead 
to optimal abatement effort. According to the simulations, the optimal number of 
inspections in the targeted group usually lies between half and three quarters of the total 
number of inspections. 
 
1.2 The Model 
1.2.1 Firm behavior under dynamic enforcement 
Consider a total of n  homogenous firms with identical abatement functions and 
abatement cost functions. Every firm faces a standard, s , above which excess emissions 
are penalized with a fixed fine, γ . Denote a firm’s abatement function as ( ) eTeg −= , 
where T is the firm’s total emissions, and e  is the firm’s abatement effort. Let the firm’s 
intended emissions be ε+−= eTz , where ε  is a random error term that is 
independently and identically distributed across all firms with mean zero, density 
function ( )εf  and distribution function ( )εF . The random errors may represent 
measurement errors or other factors affecting a firm’s emissions that are beyond the 
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firm’s control. Thus the probability that a firm with abatement effort e  is found out of 
compliance is  
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )[ ]egsFsegszeQ −−=>+=>= 1PrPr ε .    (1.1) 
When a firm is inspected, it also incurs a fixed cost, denoted α . The fixed cost 
represents the pecuniary and nonpecuniary costs borne by the firm other than the 
abatement costs, such as those associated with paperwork preparations for inspection.  
The firm’s total cost in a single period can be written as 
( ) ( )[ ]αγρμ ++= eQec ,       (1.2) 
where ( )ec  is the abatement cost function, and ρ is the probability that the firm is 
inspected. 
In a targeting enforcement regime, the n  firms are classified into two groups, 1 
and 2, where group 2 is the targeted group with tougher enforcement. To keep the model 
simple, I assume that the only difference in the treatment of the two groups is the 
probability of inspection, which is higher in group 2 than in group 1. The penalty for 
violation, the fixed inspection cost and the standard are the same for all firms regardless 
of their group status. 
Let 1n and 2n denote group sizes, where nnn =+ 21 . In each period, a total of m  
( nm <≤3 )5 firms are inspected, with 1m  of them randomly selected from group 1 and 
2m  from group 2. The number of inspections m  is exogenously fixed by the inspection 
capacity. Note that 111 / nm=ρ and 222 / nm=ρ  are effectively the inspection 
                                                 
5 Here m is restricted to be greater or equal to 3 because otherwise leverage between groups is impossible.  
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probabilities in each group. So 21 ρρ < must hold for group 2 to be the targeted group. Of 
the 21 mm +  inspected firms, the 1m  firms with the lowest emissions in period t are 
placed in group 1 for period 1+t , and the 2m  firms with the highest emissions are placed 
in group 2. If a firm is not inspected in a specific period, it stays in the same group.  
The structure of this transition process induces rank-order tournaments among 
inspected firms. In a tournament, the probability that a firm wins is a function of its own 
effort level, as well as the effort levels of other inspected firms. Even if a firm is found to 
be in compliance with the standard, it may nevertheless end up in group 2 in the next 
period if its emissions are among the 2m  highest. Similarly, a non-compliant firm may be 
placed in group 1 if the emission levels of other firms turn out to be higher. In 
equilibrium, firms in the same group should exert the same optimal effort. So the 
probability that an inspected firm from group i , 2,1=i , ends up in group 2 in the next 
period can be denoted as ( )jiii eeep ,, − , where ie  and ie−  are the effort levels of this 
specific firm and other firms in the same group, respectively, and je  is the effort level of 
firms in the other group. As higher effort raises the probability that a firm wins in the 
tournament, it follows that ( ) 0/,, <∂∂ − ijiii eeeep . 
For any firm in this regulation scheme, its decision is choosing the level of 
abatement effort to minimize the expected present value (EPV) of the total cost in all 
periods. The firm’s decision actually follows a Markov chain process. The transition 
matrix that describes the probabilities of firms moving from one group to the other is 
shown in Table 1.1 in appendices (the arguments in ip ’s are omitted).  
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Let itV  denote the EPV of the total cost for a firm starting from group i  in period 
t . It follows that, 
( ) ( ) ( )1211111111 1 ++ +−+= tttttttt VpVpV δρρδμ ,     (1.3) 
( ) ( ) ( )[ ] ( )2222112222 111 ++ −−+−+= tttttttt VpVpV ρδδρμ ,   (1.4) 
where δ is the discount factor. Basically, these equations state that the EPV of the total 
cost for a firm is the sum of its current period cost and the discounted EPV of the total 
cost starting from the next period. The firm then chooses the optimal effort levels to 
minimize itV . Assuming interior solutions, the first order condition for this optimization 
problem is,  
 ( )
i
i
i
i
i
e
pVV
e ∂
∂−−=∂
∂ ρδμ 12 .       (1.5) 
 According to the ergodic theorem of Markov chains, the optimal strategy for a 
firm is stationary (Harrington, 1988; Kohlas, 1982). Therefore, the notation for time, t , is 
dropped from the first order condition above.  
Notice that 12 VV −  is actually the cost differential between firms starting from 
group 1 versus group 2, and it can be solved from equations (1.3) and (1.4) to be, 
( )[ ] 0111 1122
12
12 >−−−−
−=−
pp
VV ρρδ
μμ
. 
In equation (1.5), the only negative term on the right hand side is ii ep ∂∂ / . It 
follows that 0/ * >∂∂ ii eμ . For a convex cost function iμ , this implies that *ie is higher 
than the optimal effort level under static enforcement ie~ , which satisfies 0~/ =∂∂ ii eμ . 
In fact, this condition reveals one of the advantages of targeting enforcement: firms in 
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both groups have an extra incentive to increase abatement effort levels. By differentiating 
the EPV of the total cost in the two groups, targeting enforcement creates so-called 
leverage effects on a firm’s emissions and abatement decisions. Firms in both groups, 
anticipating the threat of being in group 2 and facing the higher inspection probability in 
the next period, exert more effort in response. 
Based on the set-up of the model, it is easy to show that *1
*
2 ee >  must hold. In 
fact, this is an expected result of targeting enforcement. When a firm is in group 2, it is at 
a disadvantage as the EPV of its total cost is higher than the EPV of the total cost for 
firms in group 1. Therefore, this firm should exert more effort to secure a higher 
probability of winning in the tournament. On the other hand, firms in group 1 face a 
lower inspection frequency and exert less effort.  
Equation (1.5) characterizes the optimal effort level of the firms in each group, 
( )snme iii ,,,, αγ . The left-hand side of the equation is the marginal change in the current 
period cost. The right -hand side represents the marginal decrease in the EPV of the total 
cost as a higher ie  reduces the probability of being in group 2 in the next period. Even 
though it means incurring higher cost in the current period, a firm is nevertheless willing 
to exert more effort now in exchange for the expected savings as a result of decreased 
probability of facing tougher enforcement in the future. The optimal effort level for any 
firm should be the one that equates the marginal change in one-period cost to the 
discounted savings on the expected future cost.  
 
1.2.2 Regulator’s monitoring and enforcement strategies 
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 Now consider a regulator who is responsible for monitoring the n firms and 
enforcing the standard. The potential policy instruments at its disposal include the 
inspection frequency, which is determined by the allocation of inspections, the standard 
and the penalty for violation.6 However, to emphasize the structure of enforcement with 
fixed inspection capacity, I only consider the case in which the inspection frequency is 
the only choice variable for the regulator.  
 Recall that the inspection probabilities are defined as 111 / nm=ρ and 222 / nm=ρ . 
The regulator’s objective is to optimally allocate the inspections to each group and 
determine the sizes of the two groups to minimize the total emissions of all firms, with 
the assumption that this minimum total emission level is not below the social optimal 
level.7 Given that the abatement function ( )eg , is a decreasing, linear function common 
to all firms, minimizing total emissions is equivalent to maximizing total effort. 
Formally, the regulator’s problem is to, 
*
22
*
11,
enenMax
ii nm
+   
As mentioned previously, the traditional optimization tools—the first order 
conditions with respect to the choice variables—do not apply here. Since the choice 
variables can take integer values only, the derivatives of the objective function with 
respect to these variables do not exist. Comparing the total effort from all possible 
                                                 
6 Although the regulator may also have some influence on the fixed cost borne by the inspected firms and 
the variance of the error term, it is more likely that these parameters are beyond the control of the regulator.  
7Theoretically the social optimal emission level is determined by the social benefits and social costs of 
emissions, which, in turn, determine the standard. Viscusi and Zeckhause (1979) and Jones (1989) address 
the issue of standard setting under incomplete enforcement. However, the discussion of environmental 
standard is beyond the scope of this paper. So I simply assume that the minimum total emissions from the 
optimal inspection strategy do not exceed the social optimal emission level so that the optimal leverage is 
desirable. 
  16
allocations to determine the optimal enforcement strategy is not feasible due to the 
complexity of the firm’s problem. Therefore, I briefly discuss some intuitive inferences 
here. In the next section I use simulations to explore the characteristics of the optimal 
allocation.  
To simplify the exposition, I restrict attention to the case in which the number of 
firms in group 2 is equal to the number of inspections in that group. In other words, firms 
in group 2 face an inspection probability of one. This makes 22 mn = , 21 mnn −= , and 
21 mmm −= . So it reduces a problem with two choice variables to a problem with one 
choice variable, 2m . The simplifying assumption is also consistent with the concept of 
optimal leverage to some extent. According to the comparative statics results derived in 
Harford (1991), increasing the inspection probability and the penalty for violation in the 
targeted group leads to lower emission levels from firms in both groups. As the only 
difference between staying in the two groups in this model is the frequency of inspection, 
a higher 2ρ  is desirable. With this restriction, the regulator chooses 2m  to maximize the 
total abatement effort.  
Now consider a regulator allocating 10 inspections among 100 firms. To describe 
the trends of firm effort under different policy choices, I start with an extreme case where 
there is only one inspection in group 2; that is, 122 == nm , 91 =m  and 991 =n . In the 
tournament, nine group 1 firms and one group 2 firm are competing in period t for the 
chance of being placed in group 1 in period 1+t . Basically, group 2 firms can be 
regarded as strong competitors as their abatement effort is high; group 1 firms are 
relatively weak competitors with lower abatement effort. If the regulator increases 2m  to 
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2, the firms in group 2 will increase their effort due to two forces. The first lies in the 
leverage effect. Allocating all inspections but one to group 1 results in the highest 
possible inspection probability in group 1 under leverage enforcement, with 09.01 =ρ . 
When 22 =m , the inspection probability in group 1 decreases to 08.01 =ρ , which makes 
the cost differential between the two groups become larger. So it is optimal for group 2 
firms to abate more in order to raise their chance of winning in the tournament. The 
second force is a result of the competition effect. Competing with nine other group 1 
firms, the only group 2 firm has a high chance of winning in the tournament. After the 
change in allocation, a group 2 firm has to compete with the other group 2 firm and eight 
group 1 firms. As a result, intensive competition drives up the effort of group 2 firms. 
The two forces also impose similar effects on the effort of firms in group 1. Yet the 
overall change in the abatement effort of group 1 firms may not necessarily increase. The 
reduced inspection probability in group 1 leads to a lower expected penalty for violation, 
which dissipates the incentive for group 1 firms to reduce emissions. Therefore, the 
overall change in the effort of group 1 firms is generally ambiguous.  
Another extreme case is to allocate all but one inspection to group 2. This means 
922 == nm , 11 =m  and 911 =n . Now the competition for being placed in group 1 in the 
next period is among one group 1 firm and nine group 2 firms, and only the firm with the 
lowest emission level wins in the tournament. If the regulator reduces 2m  to 8, two 
changes in the regulatory scheme affect the effort levels: (1) the inspection probability in 
group 1 increases from 0.01 to 0.02 and the cost differential decreases with it; (2) firms in 
the tournament compete with one more group 1 firm and one fewer group 2 firm, and the 
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two firms with the lowest emission levels win, so the competition becomes less intensive. 
For group 1 firms the smaller cost differential and less competition means reducing 
abatement effort is optimal, but the higher inspection probability induces group 1 firms to 
increase effort. Overall, the change in the effort of group 1 firms is ambiguous. On the 
other hand, group 2 firms lower abatement effort with the smaller cost differential and the 
reduced competition. But as a result of the interaction among firms, group 2 firms may 
still exert more effort in response if group 1 firms increase their effort. 
In summary, assigning only one inspection in group 2 may not be optimal because 
reallocating one inspection from group 1 to group 2 generates more effort from firms in 
group 2. Although the effort of group 1 firms may decrease, placing one more firm in 
group 2 may still be optimal if increased in the effort from group 2 firms offsets tat 
decrement. On the other hand, increasing inspections in group 2 to the maximum may not 
always induce the most effort from all firms. The optimal enforcement strategy depends 
on the marginal changes in firm effort when the allocation changes. 
 
1.2.3 The benchmark: static enforcement 
 To set a benchmark for comparison, I briefly outline a static model of 
enforcement. In a static model, where m  of the n  firms are randomly selected for 
inspection in each period, a representative firm chooses the optimal abatement effort to 
minimize its one-period cost. Specifically, a firm’s problem is to,  
( ) ( )[ ]αγμ ++= eQ
n
mecMin
e
, 
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where γ , α , ( )ec  and ( )eQ  are defined as before. The optimal choice of effort, *~e , is 
determined implicitly by, 
( ) ( )** ~'~' eQ
n
mec γ−=       (1.7) 
Equation 1.7 suggests that under static enforcement, a firm should choose the 
abatement level such that the marginal abatement cost is equal to the marginal expected 
benefit, that is, the marginal decrease in the expected penalty  
 
1.3 Simulations 
 To characterize the optimal enforcement strategy, I use numerical techniques to 
show the allocations of inspections that result in the maximum total effort of all firms. 
First, the cost of abatement effort function is specified as ( ) 2weec = . Second, for the 
distribution assumptions of the error term, I consider both the normal distribution and the 
uniform distribution. A desirable feature of a normal distribution with mean zero is that 
the peak of its density function occurs at the point where the revealed emissions through 
inspection are equal to the firm’s intended emissions. To test the robustness of the model, 
I also analyze simulations under the assumption of uniformly distributed error terms.  
 For the parameters in the model, I assign the following specific numbers in the 
baseline examples (Table 1.2).  
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According to empirical statistics, the abatement costs that firms incur are fairly 
high compared with penalties and other sanctions.8 Therefore, the coefficient in the 
abatement cost function, w , is set higher than other parameters.  
 
1.3.1. Normally distributed errors 
 Assuming that the random errors follow a normal distribution with mean zero and 
variance 2σ , I conduct four sets of simulations in this sub-section. First, I establish a 
baseline numerical example with a single set of parameters. By comparing the total effort 
of firms from all possible inspection allocations, I determine the optimal allocation for 
this specific set of parameters. Then I use the baseline parameters as a starting point and 
change the four key parameters, s , γ , α , and 2σ . This analysis serves two purposes: (1) 
it is used to check if the results of optimal allocation from the first example continue to 
hold when parameters change; (2) it shows the effects of changing parameters on the 
optimal effort of individual firms and the total effort of all firms. In the third set of 
simulations, I increase the total number of inspections and the total number of firms 
being regulated. Last but not least, I fix the total number of firms and increase the number 
of inspections, one at a time. The last two sets of examples are used to check the 
robustness of the results for different inspection capacities and to characterize the pattern 
of the optimal inspection allocations.  
                                                 
8 For example, Pollution Abatement Costs and Expenditures Survey (1999) reveals that the total abatement 
cost across all industries amounts to $5.8 billion. The total payment to the government, including 
permits/fees and charges, fines/penalties and other, is $1.0 billion according to the same survey.  
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In the first set of examples, I assume that the enforcement capacity for the 
regulator allows 4 inspections out of 10 firms. The standard deviation of the error term is 
set at 0.45. The equilibrium effort of firms in each group and the total effort of all firms 
are shown in Table 1.3.  
Several patterns can be observed in Table 1.3. First, the random inspection 
strategy without leverage (corresponding to 02 =m ) induces the least total effort. 
Therefore targeting is superior to static enforcement. Second, if an inspection is moved 
from group 1 to group 2, the effort of each group 2 firm increases while the effort of 
group 1 firms may increase or decrease. When 2m  increases, it creates more competition 
among firms in both groups, because a group 1 firm is replaced by a group 2 firm in the 
tournament. In this example, the effort of a group 2 firm increases steadily when 2m  
increases from 1 to 3. However, group 1 firms may exert less effort because the increase 
in 2m  lowers the inspection probability in group 1 (shown in the last column in Table 
1.3). Thus the overall change in the effort of group 1 firms depends on the relative 
magnitude of two effects: increased competition and decreased inspection probability. 
For example, the effort of each group 1 firm increases when 2m  increases from 1 to 2 
because the effect of the increased competition outweighs that of the decreased inspection 
probability. When 2m  increases from 2 to 3, group 1 firms lower their effort, since the 
effect of the decreased inspection probability dominates. Although firms in group 1 
decrease their effort when 2m  increases from 2 to 3, setting 32 =m  yields the highest 
total effort because the increased effort by group 2 firms ( 22en ) outweighs the decreased 
effort by group 1 firms ( 11en ). 
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 The key result from this example is that the regulator minimizes total emissions 
when it leverages its limited inspections by allocating most of them to the targeted group. 
Next, I change the four key parameters in the model, including s , γ , α , and 2σ , to test 
the robustness of this result.  
Figures 1.1-1.4 (in appendices) show the results of all possible inspection 
allocations when s , γ , α , or 2σ  changes. Each figure consists of three graphs, showing 
the total effort of all firms, the effort level of individual firms in group 1 and group 2, 
respectively. A straight line representing the difference between T  and s  is added to the 
last two graphs in each figure. In expectation, a firm is in compliance if its effort is 
sufficient to eliminate the excess emissions above the standard (in the absence of random 
errors), which is sT − . Thus, effort levels above this line suggest that firms are over-
complying in expectation. That is, without the random errors, a firm’s intended emissions 
are below the standard. Similarly, effort levels below this line imply under-compliance in 
expectation.  
Several results can be concluded from Figures 1.1-1.4. First of all, over the ranges 
of the four parameters, inspecting three firms in group 2 and one firm in group 1 
( 32 =m ) always results in the highest total effort in these examples. Therefore allocating 
most of the resources to monitoring firms in group 2 is an optimal enforcement strategy 
for the case of 4 inspections. Second, firms in group 1 exert much less effort than firms in 
group 2. It is an expected result of leverage since firms in group 2 face tougher 
enforcement. Third, the trend of the total effort is dominated by the changes in the effort 
of group 2 firms. This is a consequence of the previous result since the effort level of any 
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single firm in group 2 is much higher than the effort level of every group 1 firm. Last, the 
total effort from the static enforcement ( 02 =m ) is always lower than the total effort 
level from targeting enforcement. Even a small leverage ( 12 =m ) adds incentives for 
firms to increase effort. 
 As mentioned earlier, firms are over-complying with the standard in expectation if 
their effort levels are above the straight line. According to the graphs in Figures 1.1-1.4, 
firms in group 1 almost never over-comply. Instead, they under-comply in expectation 
substantially. An exception is: group 1 firms over-comply when the standard is equal to a 
firm’s actual emissions. The expected compliance status of firms in group 2 depends on 
the magnitude of the parameters. Specifically, firms in group 2 tend to over-comply in 
expectation when the penalty for violation and the fixed inspection cost are high, as a 
higher penalty or inspection cost induces more effort. The firms in group 2 also over-
comply when the standard is high. Notice that when the standard is equal to a firm’s 
actual emissions, firms in both groups over-comply despite that the expected penalty is 
zero. These over-complying behaviors of firms are driven by their intention to avoid or 
reduce the expected inspection costs. 
 The numeric examples shown in Figures 1.1-1.4 also describe the trends in the 
effort of individual firms when the parameters changes. Overall, the effort of firms in 
group 2 is more responsive to the changes in parameters according to the shapes of the 
curves. The four key parameters, s , γ , α , and 2σ , are related to the inspection 
probability: the higher the probability, the more likely that a firm incurs sanctions or 
inspection costs and the more likely that a firm is involved in the tournament. Since firms 
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in group 2 are inspected in every period, changes in these parameters have more effect on 
their choices of effort.  
In Figure 1.1, the effort of group 1 firms increases with s , and the effort of group 
2 firms originally increases with s  and then decreases when s  approaches a firm’s total 
emissions, T . Although one would expect that relaxing the standard leads to a lower 
effort level in general, in this model the changes in a firm’s effort actually depend on the 
distribution of the error term, the firm’s expected compliance status, and the effect of the 
standard on 12 VV − . Under the assumption of a normally distributed error term with mean 
zero, the derivative of the marginal probability of violation, ( ) [ ])(''' ** ii egsfeQ −= , is 
positive if )( *iegs − is below zero. This implies when the firm’s expected emissions, 
( )*ieg , exceed the standard, relaxing the standard makes the probability of violation 
decrease at an increasing rate with more effort. So firms are willing to exert more effort 
to take the advantage of the decreased expected penalty. If a firm’s expected emissions 
are below the standard, increasing the allowed emissions only results in lower effort, 
because exerting more effort only reduces the probability of a violation at a decreasing 
rate.  
 Figures 1.2-1.4 show that γ and α are positively related to the effort level while 
2σ  exhibits a negative relationship with the effort level. First, γ  represents sanctions on 
a firm’s violation of the standard, no matter to which group the firm belongs. As γ  
increases, the expected penalty for any given level of effort is higher. With an unchanged 
cost of effort function, the firm should increase effort to eliminate the increase in the 
expected penalty caused by the higher γ . Meanwhile, changing γ  also affects 12 VV − . If 
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the cost differential also increases when γ  increases, firms in both groups increase effort. 
Next, whether a firm incurs the fixed inspection cost depends on the probability that the 
firm is inspected. Increasing α effectively magnifies the leverage of targeting, because 
with unchanged inspection probabilities the cost differential between the two groups 
becomes larger. Thus the benefits of staying in group 1 are more significant and firms in 
both groups increase their optimal abatement effort. Third, although the variance of the 
error term is not explicitly involved in the equations, the intuition is straightforward. 
According to the tournament literature, when the randomness associated with the 
measurement of players’ performance is small, the players tend to exert more effort. 
Similarly, a smaller variance means that a firm’s intended emissions, ( )*ieg , are more 
accurately measured. As a result, the firm increases its effort. 
Those previous sets of simulations show that allocating more inspections to the 
targeted group is optimal. For an inspection capacity with 4=m , the optimal allocation 
is 32 =m . The three inspections allocated to group 2 can be interpreted as 2/1 m+ , 
4/3m , or 1−m . The simple example of allocating 4 inspections are not sufficient to 
draw a conclusion whether the optimal number of inspections in group 2 should be 
around 2/m , 4/3m  or 1−m  for higher values of m . In the next set of simulations, I 
address this issue and check the consistency of other relevant results in the previous 
analysis as well. It is assumed that 10 out of 100 firms are inspected in each period. The 
standard deviation of the error term is set at 0.8 to ensure the existence of solutions.9 
                                                 
9 The existence of solutions requires that the variance is sufficiently large. See Lazear and Rosen (1981), 
footnote 2, p. 845.  
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Under these assumptions, I first set the baseline for the example of 10 inspections and 
then change the four enforcement parameters, s , γ , α , and 2σ . 
The optimal effort of individual firms and the total effort in the baseline example 
are shown in Table 1.4. As 2m  increases, 
*
1e  increases gradually until 52 =m , after 
which *1e  begins to fall. Similarly, 
*
2e  and the total effort both increase with 2m  until 2m  
reaches 7, then *2e  and the total effort decrease. The intuition behind these patterns is 
similar to that in the example with 4 inspections. Focusing on the total effort, it is clear 
that allocating 91 =−m  inspections to group 2 is not optimal. The optimal allocation is 
72 =m , which is between 2/m  and 4/3m . Also, consistent with the previous results, 
the random inspection strategy without leverage results in the lowest total effort.  
 To present the patterns of firm effort with the changes in allocation, the same 
baseline results are shown in Figure 1.5. In comparison, the effort levels of group 1 firms 
are extremely low and firms in group 2 exert much higher effort, especially when 6 or 7 
inspections are allocated to that group. Consequently, the changes in the total effort are 
closely related to the changes in the effort of group 2 firms.  
 Next, I change the enforcement parameters in the example of 10 inspections to 
examine the consistency of the optimal allocations and the effects on the effort of 
individual firms. Figure 1.6 shows the total effort associated with the optimal inspection 
allocations when s , γ , α , or 2σ  change. The effort levels of individual firms in each 
group are shown in Appendix 1.A. 
 When the enforcement parameters change, the optimal enforcement strategy 
generally occurs when the regulator allocates 6 or 7 inspections to group 2. Specifically, 
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inspecting 7 firms in group 2 is optimal for higher γ  and α , or lower s  and 2σ  (the 
numbers in the graphs indicate the optimal number of inspections in group 2); otherwise, 
allocating 6 inspections to group 2 is optimal. The shifts in the effort of group 1 firms in 
the graphs of s , γ , α  and 2σ (Appendix 1.A) reflect this change in the optimal 
inspection allocation.  
 The relationships between the total effort and the four parameters s , γ , α , and 
2σ  presented in Figure 1.7 largely confirm the results from the first set of examples. 
While increasing s  and 2σ reduces total effort, higher γ and α  induce more total effort. 
Other similar results include: (1) the optimal effort of firms in group 1 is substantially 
lower than that of firms in group 2; (2) the shape of the total effort curve is closely related 
to the shape of the effort curve of the group 2 firms.  
 According to the numerical analyses of 4 inspections and 10 inspections, the 
optimal number of inspections in group 2 seems to lie between 2/m  and 4/3m . To 
further confirm this property, it is worthwhile examining the optimal inspection 
allocations when the number of total inspections takes other integers between 4 and 10, 
while holding the total number of firms constant. The next set of examples fulfills this 
purpose.  
 In the last set of examples, the total number of firms is fixed at 25, 50, and 100, 
respectively, and the number of inspections is increased from 4 to 10. The standard 
deviation of the random error term is still 0.8. Detailed results are shown in Tables 5-7. 
The comparison among the bold numbers within each table reveals that increasing the 
number of inspections induces more total effort from the optimal enforcement when the 
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total number of firms is held constant. So the extra inspection capacity is desirable for the 
regulator. Meanwhile, allocating more inspections to group 2 remains to be optimal. 
When the total number of inspections is small, inspecting only one firm in group 1 and 
putting all other inspections in group 2 results in the maximum total effort. Yet, when 
extra budget allows one more inspection, it is not always optimal to allocate this extra 
inspection to group 2. Whether the regulator should put the extra inspection in group 1 or 
2 depends on the marginal change in the effort of firms in each group ( *iien ). For 
example, with 7 inspections out of 25 firms, the optimal allocation is 62 =m , and the 
effort levels of firms in group 1 and 2 are 0.0014 and 0.0854, respectively. When the 
number of inspections increases to 8 and the allocation changes to 72 =m , the effort 
levels of firms in group 1 decrease by 0.0002 and firms in group 2 by 0.02. However, for 
the allocation 62 =m  with 8 total number of inspections, the effort levels of firms in 
group 1 and 2 increase to 0.0042 and 0.1712, respectively. Thus inspecting 2 firms in 
group 1 and 6 firms in group 2 is optimal for a total of 8 inspections. Overall, this set of 
examples confirm that the optimal number of inspections in group 2 should be above 
2/m  and below 4/3m . 
 
1.3.2 Firms’ Best Responses 
In the theoretical model developed in this paper, the inspected firms compete with 
each other in tournaments. The interactions among firms can be summarized using best 
response curves, which describe one firm’s best response to the changes in the effort of 
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another firm. In this section, I discuss the best response curves for the optimal allocation, 
32 =m , when there are 4 inspections.  
Figure 1.7 shows: (1) the best response between the only group 1 firm and one of 
the group 2 firms while holding the other two group 2 firms’ effort at their equilibrium 
levels; (2) the best response between two group 2 firms while holding the group 1 firm 
and the third group 2 firm at their respective equilibrium levels.  
 In Figure 1.7 (a), the best response curve of the group 1 firm is fairly flat with a 
slightly decreasing trend, indicating that the changes in the effort of one group 2 firm 
have little impact on the group 1 firm. The best response curve of the group 2 firm 
exhibits an apparent decreasing trend, except at the beginning where the curve is almost 
flat. Since the effort of the other two group 2 firms is fixed at their equilibrium levels, the 
intersection of the two curves represents the equilibrium effort levels of the group 1 firm 
and the group 2 firm in this numerical example. Around the equilibrium point, the effort 
of the group 1 firm decreases with that of the group 2 firm, and vice versa. The best 
response curves of the two group 2 firms, shown in Figure 1.7 (b), are symmetric with the 
same pattern: increasing at the beginning and then decreasing. The intersection of the two 
curves is the equilibrium effort level of the group 2 firms, around which the effort of one 
group 2 firm decreases with that of the other group 2 firm. 
 
1.3.3 Uniformly distributed errors 
 In this section, I test the robustness of the results in Section 1.3.1 with uniformly 
distributed errors on the support [-0.5, 0.5]. Following the first set of examples in Section 
1.3.1, it is assumed that the inspection capacity allows 4 inspections out of 10 firms. The 
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effort levels in the baseline treatment are listed in Table 1.8. The basic results from the 
normal distribution assumption are confirmed: among all possible allocations, 32 =m  is 
the optimal enforcement strategy; the static enforcement induces the least total effort; the 
trends in the effort of individual firms when 2m  increases from 1 to 3 can be explained 
by the same intuition discussed in the previous sub-section. 
 Figure 1.8 shows the total effort from all possible allocations when the 
enforcement parameters change. The results under the assumption of normally distributed 
errors are largely confirmed by the examples with uniformly distributed errors. Over the 
ranges of the parameters considered in the analysis, assigning three inspections to group 2 
is generally optimal and static enforcement leads to the least total effort. Results 
regarding effort of individual firms (shown in Appendix 1.B) also agree with the 
corresponding results from the examples with normally distributed errors. The effort of 
group 1 firms is always much lower than that of group 2 firms. Firms in group 1 almost 
never over-comply in expectation while firms in group 2 over-comply in expectation with 
higher s , γ  or α . 
 
1.4 Conclusion 
 In environmental regulations, optimally allocating limited enforcement resources 
is crucial for effective pollution controls. In this paper, I develop a model of monitoring 
and enforcement with an environmental standard when a regulator faces fixed inspection 
capacity.  
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  Based on the theoretical analysis, I characterize the optimal allocation of a fixed 
number of inspections with the aid of simulations. The major conclusion is that a 
regulator facing fixed inspection capacity should leverage the limited inspections by 
allocating more inspections to the targeted group. The optimal number of inspections in 
the targeted group usually lies between 2/m  and 4/3m , where m  is the fixed number of 
inspections. The numerical examples also confirm the superiority of leveraged 
enforcement such that static enforcement induces the least total effort from all firms. 
These results are robust to the distribution assumptions of the error term, and to different 
ranges of enforcement parameters, such as the number of inspections, the penalty for 
violations, the fixed inspection cost, and the standard. 
 The model presented in this paper is based on the assumption that a regulator 
faces fixed inspection capacity in every period. How restrictive the inspection capacity is 
depends on the time horizon one considers. From a short-run perspective, the 
enforcement budget and the inspection personnel for a regulator are unlikely to change. 
The effectiveness of the enforcement is confined by the limited number of inspections. In 
the long-run, the regulator may be able to adjust the budget or inspection staff according 
to actual firm behaviors. 
This model can be extended in several directions in future work. For 
simplification purposes, I have assumed that the penalty for violation and the standard are 
constant across firms. One possible modification to the model is to set such parameters at 
different levels for the two groups. Harford (1991) points out that differentiating the 
standard, in addition to the inspection probabilities across groups, may be optimal. 
Another assumption that could be relaxed is the probability of inspection in the targeted 
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group. It is assumed in the model that all firms in the targeted group are inspected in 
every period. Although a high inspection frequency in the targeted group increases the 
leverage, it may also facilitate firms in that group with more opportunities of moving to 
the non-targeted group. Thus it is interesting to investigate firm behavior and the optimal 
policy if the inspection probability in the targeted group is less than one. Furthermore, it 
is assumed that firms are homogeneous in this model. In the real world, a regulator may 
face the task of monitoring firms with different abatement costs. Raymond (1999) points 
out that with asymmetric information or firm heterogeneity, the optimal regulatory policy 
depends on the distribution of costs among firms. Adding firm heterogeneity will 
complicate the model, but it may provide further insights.  
 Like other targeting enforcement models, the model developed in this paper is 
subject to critiques. For instance, a direct result of the targeting regulation is the different 
abatement effort and emission levels from homogenous firms. Hence, the marginal 
abatement costs are not equal across firms, which violates the condition for minimizing 
the social costs of emission controls (Harford and Harrrington, 1991).  
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Figure 1.1 Changing the standard, 4=m  
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Figure 1.2 Changing penalty for violation, 4=m  
  39
0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
alpha
to
ta
l
changing fixed inspection cost
 
 
m2=0
m2=1
m2=2
m2=3
 
0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
alpha
e 1
changing fixed inspection cost
 
 
m2=0
m2=1
m2=2
m2=3
 
0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
alpha
e 2
changing fixed inspection cost
 
 
m2=0
m2=1
m2=2
m2=3
 
Figure 1.3 Changing fixed inspection cost, 4=m  
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Figure 1.4 Changing variance of error, 4=m  
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Figure 1.5 Effort levels, 10=m   
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Figure 1.6 Changing parameters, 10=m  
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Figure 1.6, cont. 
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Figure 1.7 Best responses, 4=m  
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Figure 1.8 Changing parameters, uniform distribution 
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Figure 1.8, cont. 
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Table 1.1 Markov transition matrix 
 To Group 
From Group 1 2 
1 111 pρ−  11 pρ
2 ( )22 1 p−ρ ( )22 11 p−− ρ
 
 
Table 1.2 Parameters  
Total 
emissions, 
T  
The 
standard, 
s  
Coefficient of 
the abatement 
cost function, w
Penalty for 
violation, γ  
Fixed 
inspection 
cost, α  
Discount 
rate, δ  
2.5 2 18 3 0.5 0.9 
 
 
Table 1.3 Baseline example: 4=m  
2m  
*
1e  
*
2e  
*
11en
*
22en
*
22
*
11 enen + 1ρ  
3 0.0129 0.2317 0.0900 0.6950 0.7850 1/7 
2 0.0363 0.1571 0.2906 0.3142 0.6048 1/4 
1 0.0267 0.0769 0.2407 0.0769 0.3177 1/3 
0 0.0166 -- 0.1660 -- 0.1660 4/10 
Note: inconsistencies of calculation are due to rounding errors. 
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Table 1.4 Baseline example: 10=m  
2m  
*
1e  
*
2e
*
11en
*
22en  
*
22
*
11 enen +
9 0.0005 0.0462 0.0413 0.4158 0.4572 
8 0.0015 0.1160 0.1390 0.9280 1.0668 
7 0.0030 0.2774 0.2790 1.9418 2.2207 
6 0.0063 0.2465 0.5906 1.4790 2.0696 
5 0.0084 0.1623 0.7933 0.8115 1.6046 
4 0.0072 0.1021 0.6951 0.4084 1.1034 
3 0.0050 0.0627 0.4851 0.1881 0.6732 
2 0.0035 0.0423 0.3477 0.0846 0.4324 
1 0.0031 0.0359 0.3106 0.0359 0.3465 
0 0.0034 -- 0.3428 -- 0.3428 
Notes:  1. inconsistencies of calculation are due to rounding errors; 
   2. bold numbers indicate the maximum within each column. 
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Table 1.5 25=n  
 Number of inspections in group 2 
Total number 
of inspections 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
4 0.2345 0.4383 0.5356       
5 0.2454 0.4542 0.6727 0.5970      
6 0.2606 0.4450 0.7191 0.8735 0.5696     
7 0.2653 0.4273 0.7288 0.8588 0.9772 0.5117    
8 0.2972 0.4123 0.7338 0.4206 1.1813 0.9468 0.4613   
9 0.3237 0.4055 0.6269 0.9602 1.2481 1.2753 1.2408 0.4314  
10 0.3480 0.4087 0.584 0.8986 1.2428 1.4297 1.2408 0.7361 0.4218 
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Table 1.6 50=n  
 Number of inspections in group 2 
Total number 
of inspections 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
4 0.2420 0.4627 0.5832       
5 0.2528 0.4822 0.7339 0.6694      
6 0.2656 0.4743 0.7874 1.0062 0.6455     
7 0.2686 0.4555 0.8039 1.0597 1.2021 0.5764    
8 0.3006 0.4373 0.8254 0.4377 1.4409 1.2122 0.5105   
9 0.3256 0.4263 0.6949 1.1030 1.4976 1.6951 1.7722 0.4663  
10 0.3470 0.4248 0.6450 1.0394 1.4907 1.8439 1.7722 0.9389 0.4454 
 
 
  51
 
Table 1.7 100=n  
 Number of inspections in group 2 
Total number 
of inspections 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
4 0.2457 0.4747 0.6082       
5 0.2564 0.4957 0.7645 0.7087      
6 0.2681 0.4883 0.8203 1.0782 0.6866     
7 0.2701 0.4689 0.8394 1.1593 1.3413 0.6110    
8 0.3023 0.4492 0.8695 0.4451 1.5842 1.3862 0.5363   
9 0.3266 0.4361 0.7264 1.1688 1.6193 1.9827 2.2207 0.4842  
10 0.3465 0.4324 0.6732 1.1034 1.6046 2.0696 2.2207 1.0668 0.4572 
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Table 1.8 Baseline example: 4=m  
2m  1e  2e  11en  22en  2211 enen +  
3 0.0216 0.3173 0.1511 0.9518 1.1029 
2 0.0418 0.1674 0.3348 0.3348 0.6696 
1 0.0498 0.1308 0.4481 0.1308 0.5788 
0 0.0333 -- 0.3333 -- 0.3333 
Note: inconsistencies of calculation are due to rounding errors. 
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Appendix 1.A Effort of individual firms in group 1 and 2 when there are 10 inspections 
out of 50 firms. (The numbers in the graphs indicate the optimal number of inspections in 
group 2) 
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Appendix Figure 1.A1 Changing the standard, 10=m  
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Appendix Figure 9A2 Changing penalty for violation, 10=m  
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Appendix Figure 10A3 Changing fixed inspection cost, 10=m  
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Appendix Figure 11A4 Changing variance of error, 10=m  
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Note that when 5.2≥γ or 6.0≥α , the effort level of group 1 firms slightly 
decreases with these two parameters. In a static enforcement regime, increasing the 
penalty for violation or the fixed inspection cost should result in firms increasing their 
abatement effort. However, in this dynamic model where firms interact with each other, 
the changes in the effort of one firm also reflect its best response to that of other firms. 
Here the decrease in the effort of group 1 firms may suggest that those firms responds to 
the increased effort of group 2 firms by exerting less effort, and this reduction outweighs 
the increase in the effort of the group 1 firms due to the direct effect of higher sanctions. 
Similar intuition can be used to explain the result that group 1 firms exert more effort 
with higher variance when 7.02 ≤σ . 
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Appendix 1.B. Effort of firms in group 1 and 2 under uniformly distributed error terms 
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Appendix Figure 12B1 Changing the standard, uniform distribution 
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Appendix Figure 13B2 Changing penalty for violation, uniform distribution 
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Appendix Figure 14B3 changing fixed inspection cost, uniform distribution 
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Appendix Figure 15B4 changing distribution range, uniform distribution 
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CHAPTER III ESSAY 2: REGULATION WITH COMPETING OBJECTIVES, 
SELF-REPORTING, AND IMPERFECT MONITORING  
 
 
 
 
 
This is a joint work with Dr. Mary Evans and Scott Gilpatric. A slightly different 
version of this chapter is to be published in the Journal of Environmental and 
Economic Management. 
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2.1 Introduction 
Regulatory agencies, including the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), 
commonly cite two categories of benefits associated with information disclosure 
programs. The first, an indirect benefit, arises from the internalization of the social costs 
of emissions (and consequent reductions in emissions) due to market responses to 
disclosures or regulatory instruments such as Pigovian taxes on disclosed emissions. The 
second, a direct benefit, results from the disclosure of previously private information. 
Referring to information disclosure programs in a recent report that describes the U.S. 
experience with various environmental policies, the EPA states “The environmental 
information embodied in these approaches has economic value...even in the absence of 
any changes in emissions by firms” (EPA, 2001, p. 153).1 Timely information about 
emissions may enable potential damages to be avoided or mitigated both by affected 
parties and public agencies. For example, disclosure may reduce consumption of 
contaminated water by alerting individuals of the need for avoidance or proper treatment. 
Disclosure may also decrease the environmental impacts of a toxic release by 
accelerating clean-up efforts. 
 Theoretical analyses have tended to represent the social cost of emissions as a 
function only of emissions levels, independent of whether the presence and magnitude of 
emissions are publicly disclosed. The empirical work has followed a similar convention 
by measuring program success in terms of reductions in emissions. Neither strand of the 
                                                 
1 In fact, the report refers to the benefits of disclosure from changes in consumer or producer behavior, such 
as reduced emissions, as “ancillary” (p. 153). 
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literature has yet to explicitly account for the possibility that disclosure of harmful 
emissions may be directly beneficial, outside of any indirect impacts of disclosure 
requirements on emissions. We develop a theoretical model that attempts to reconcile this 
apparent inconsistency between the stated motivation for information disclosure 
programs and previous analyses of such programs. 
 In our model, disclosure of emissions is directly beneficial but actual emissions 
are imperfectly observable so policymakers face a tradeoff between inducing truthful 
self-reporting and deterring emissions.2 Internalizing the social costs of emissions, such 
as through a Pigovian tax, will deter emissions, but it may also reduce incentives for 
firms to truthfully disclose their emissions.  
 When monitoring firm behavior (such as through an audit process) is costly, a 
policymaker must account for three factors when designing regulatory policy: (1) the 
benefit of reduced emissions arising from internalizing social costs, (2) the direct social 
benefit of disclosure of emissions that do occur, and (3) enforcement costs. Previous 
analyses of environmental compliance have addressed factors (1) and (3) by considering 
a regulator whose objective is to minimize emissions (Garvie and Keeler, 1994; Macho-
Stadler and Perez-Castrillo, 2005) or to minimize enforcement costs for a given level of 
compliance (Livernois and McKenna, 1999). We model the regulator’s objective in a way 
that accounts for the reduction in social costs arising both from disclosure of emissions 
                                                 
2 This trade-off is present in other regulatory settings such as consumer product and food safety. Firms are 
required to disclose product failures and hazards, but the more costly such disclosure (either due to fines or 
liability exposure) the greater the incentive firms have to conceal such information. Reducing fines or 
limiting liability costs encourages disclosure but may dull incentives to reduce product defects. However, 
this tradeoff is not present in some other regulatory settings where information disclosure programs have 
traditionally been applied, such as income taxation. 
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and a reduction in the quantity of emissions. This framework is both more general and 
more representative. In this paper our principal objective is to model the optimal policy 
choice in this context when the instruments at the regulator’s discretion are a tax on 
(disclosed) emissions and the frequency (or probability) of auditing a firm’s disclosure 
report. 
  In order to better understand the characteristics of the regulator’s trade-off 
between inducing compliance with disclosure requirements and reducing emissions, we 
develop a model of firm behavior in the context of an imperfect audit. An imperfect audit 
reveals some percentage of the firm’s actual emissions according to a known probability 
distribution. Given the imperfect nature of the audit, firms then optimize their choice of 
how much of their true emissions to disclose in order to minimize their expected costs. 
Firms also choose how much to emit conditional on their expected emissions costs. The 
regulator in turn optimally chooses the policy parameters based on his expectations about 
how firms facing a particular regulatory environment will behave. 
The model we develop adds to the literature on the role of self reporting in 
environmental regulation. Malik (1993), Swierzbinski (1994) and others have shown that 
incentive-compatible mechanisms for self reporting (in which firms are induced to 
truthfully report their emissions) can achieve enforcement cost savings and increase 
social welfare. The benefit of self reporting in these models arises due to the regulator 
having incomplete information regarding the social costs or private benefits (i.e., 
abatement costs) of emissions by a particular firm. Unlike these previous models, we 
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assume the regulator has full information in these respects.3 The social benefit from self 
reporting in our model arises very differently (and more directly) from the fact that 
reported emissions cause less social damage than undisclosed emissions. In our model 
disclosure of emissions by firms is a desirable end in itself, rather than a mechanism to 
achieve desirable emissions reductions in a more cost effective manner.4 
 This paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 develops our main model. We first 
consider the decision facing a representative firm, among many homogeneous firms, 
required to disclose emissions subject to a tax enforced through imperfect audits. We then 
analyze the optimal policy choice of the regulator, who we assume has complete 
information. Section 2.3 relaxes the homogeneous firms and perfect information 
assumptions and confirms that our main results continue to hold. Section 2.4 concludes 
with discussion of the implications of our model and possible extensions. 
  
2.2 The Model 
2.2.1 The Firm’s Problem  
We first analyze the decision facing a firm subject to a mandatory information 
disclosure policy requiring the firm to report a level of emissions to the regulator. The 
compliance decision for a firm is defined by three factors: 1) the disclosure costs the firm 
incurs as a function of its revealed emissions, 2) the penalty costs the firm incurs as a 
                                                 
3 Section 2.3 of the paper presents a variant of our model in which firms have private information. 
4 Of course regulations requiring self reporting may serve a dual purpose, both to capture direct benefits of 
disclosure and to achieve enforcement cost savings from information revelation. We focus on the direct 
benefits of disclosure to keep our model fairly straightforward and make the implications of this regulatory 
motive most transparent. 
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function of any emissions that are revealed in excess of the level it discloses, and 3) the 
nature of the auditing program.5 
Firms may face costs associated with emissions (whether disclosed or 
undisclosed) arising from a variety of sources.6 Most directly, a firm may be subject to a 
Pigovian tax on disclosed emissions, and a subsequent penalty on unreported emissions 
that are later revealed. A firm may also face current or future liability costs associated 
with emissions, both of which may be reflected immediately in the market valuation of 
the firm upon the revelation of its emissions.7 Finally, the firm may face costs associated 
with the revelation that it failed to disclose emissions when required. The revelation of 
under-reporting by a firm may be either a direct consequence of regulatory enforcement, 
or through other mechanisms such as internal whistleblowers, disclosures by the media or 
environmental watchdog groups, or simply due to random events that bring information 
into the public domain.  
 Most previous analyses of environmental compliance assume an error-free audit 
process (see for example Kaplow and Shavell (1994)and Innes (1999)), an assumption 
                                                 
5 Becker’s (1968) “optimal penalty” model provides the theoretical basis for the literature on environmental 
compliance.  The main insight from his model is that potential offenders respond to the probability of 
detection as well as the severity of the punishment. See Polinsky and Shavell (2000) (and the citations 
within) for a general review of the enforcement literature. Cohen (1999) and Heyes (2000) provide reviews 
of the environmental compliance and enforcement literature.  
6 Firms may fail to perfectly comply in some cases simply because it is costly to collect the necessary 
information (e.g., a firm may bear some cost of simply measuring its own emissions). We ignore the 
possibility here and simply assume the firm has perfect knowledge of its emissions.  
7 See Hamilton (1995), Khanna et al. (1998), and Konar and Cohen (2001) for empirical evidence on 
market reactions to releases of the Toxics Release Inventory (TRI). 
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consistent with the tax compliance literature.8 We define an audit to be error-free if it 
reveals, perhaps with some probability less than one, the exact degree of misreporting. 
Recently, Macho-Stadler and Perez-Castrillo (2005) depart from the more common 
assumption in the literature of an audit that always reveals the exact degree of 
misreporting by allowing the probability of perfect revelation to be less than one. Notice 
however that the effect of this assumption is merely to decrease the probability of 
detection (the firm now faces a compound probability). Heyes (1993) considers a similar 
audit structure where the probability that an audit (perfectly) detects non-compliance is 
endogenous. In each of these models, provided an audit occurs, it reveals either no 
misreporting or the exact degree of misreporting and therefore is consistent with our 
definition of an error-free audit. The assumption of error-free audits seems best suited to 
situations where firms make dichotomous choices to comply with a regulation or not. 
However, in the case of environmental information disclosure requirements, where 
penalties are likely to vary with the degree of noncompliance, the firm’s decision may be 
more accurately modeled as choosing the optimal degree of compliance. Therefore, we 
model compliance as a continuous choice and assume the firm faces an imperfect audit, 
one that reveals a percentage of the firm’s actual emissions.  
   We assume firms are homogeneous and consider the problem facing a 
representative firm. Let e represent the firm’s emissions and denote the firm’s benefit of 
emitting as ( )eB  where ( ) 0>′ eB  and ( ) 0<′′ eB . Let z denote the share of actual 
                                                 
8 Malik (1993) is an exception. He models a binary compliance decision allowing for errors in auditing the 
firm’s compliance status. In contrast, we model compliance with the information disclosure requirement as 
a continuous choice, which allows us to focus on behavioral changes at the intensive, rather than extensive, 
margin.  
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emissions reported by the firm, so the reported quantity of emissions is ze . For clarity and 
tractability, we assume that for each unit of reported emissions, the firm incurs a constant 
per unit cost, denoted α , which we characterize as the “tax” on emissions. Similarly, if 
the audit reveals a level of emissions that exceeds reported emissions, the firm incurs a 
constant per unit cost, denoted β , on the revealed but unreported emissions. We refer to 
 as the “penalty.” 9  
 The firm is audited with probability p. If an audit occurs it reveals a quantity of 
emissions, denoted x. We assume eux =  where u is a random variable with cumulative 
distribution function ( )uF  and probability density function ( )uf , which is strictly 
positive on the interval [ ]b,0  with 1≥b .10  We assume ( )uf  has a single mode at one. 
The model thus allows for the possibility that an audit reveals less or perhaps more than 
was actually emitted. We do not require that audits be unbiased (i.e., that [ ] 1=uE ) or that 
( )xf  be symmetrically distributed around one, but the model encompasses these 
possibilities. We assume that the audit distribution F is independent of the firm’s actual 
emissions. That is, the scale of the firm or its emissions level does not impact the 
                                                 
9 Both disclosure and penalty costs could of course be non-linear. For example, the penalty cost function 
might increase at an increasing rate with the magnitude of the violation if regulators take the view that large 
infractions should be punished severely while minor infractions receive a much milder treatment. The 
linearity assumption renders the model much more tractable and avoids issues associated with the optimal 
size of a firm as a function of the regulatory environment, which is beyond the scope of our analysis. 
10 Because the audit process as has two-sided errors yielding the possibility that emissions are “revealed” in 
excess of the actual level (as in Harford (1991)), it is possible that a firm would find it optimal to over 
comply, reporting emissions in excess of its actual level. As we discuss below, in our model the regulator 
will never find it optimal to induce overcompliance from a representative firm. Arora and Gangopadhyay 
(1995), Shimshack and Ward (2006), among others explicitly focus on overcompliance with environmental 
regulations.  
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effectiveness of audits, so the audit is equally likely to reveal any given percentage of 
actual emissions regardless of the firm’s true emissions level.  
The firm’s problem is to choose e and z to maximize the expected net benefit of 
emitting. Given our assumptions and the values of α , p, and β , the firm faces a constant 
per unit cost of emitting, denoted μ , with 
( ) ∫ −+= b
z
dttfztpzp )()(,, βαβαμ .  (2.1) 
Therefore the firm’s expected net benefit is given by:  
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ −+⋅−=⋅−=− ∫b
z
dttfztpzeeBpzeeBzeCeB )()(,,,, βαβαμ . (2.2) 
It is clear from equation (2.2) that with a constant tax and penalty and independence 
between the audit effectiveness and actual emissions levels, the firm’s optimal choice of z 
is independent of e.  Thus, our assumptions allow us to decouple the choices of e and z. 
We begin by analyzing the firm’s optimal choice of z. The first order condition for an 
interior solution on z is given by: 
 ( )[ ]*1)(
*
zFpxdFp
b
z
−== ∫ ββα   (2.3) 
where *z  denotes the optimal reported share of emissions. The first order condition 
indicates that the firm’s optimal report, *z , equates the marginal cost of reported 
emissions, , and the expected marginal benefit of reported emissions. The expected 
marginal benefit reflects the expected avoided per unit penalty on revealed but unreported 
emissions. Using equation (2.3), we can solve for z* as a function of the policy 
parameters: 
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 ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −= − β
α
p
Fz 1* 1  
With this we state the following proposition characterizing the firm’s optimal choice of z.  
All proofs are given in the appendix. 
 
Proposition 2.1. Given α , β , and p, the firm’s optimal choice of z will be such that 
(i)  0* =z  if βα p≥  
(ii)  For αβ >p  an interior solution exists with z* defined by expression (3) above.  
(iii) For an interior solution, the firm’s optimal report, *z , is decreasing in the tax on 
reported emissions, α ; increasing in the probability of audit, p; and increasing in the 
penalty on revealed but unreported emissions, β . 
 
 Note that αβ >p  is required for an interior solution on z*. That is, in order to 
elicit reporting in our model, the tax on reported emissions must be below the expected 
penalty on revealed but unreported emissions.11 We assume this condition is satisfied and 
focus attention on an interior solution for *z . 
 We now consider the firm’s optimal choice of emissions. Given *z , the firm will 
choose *e  to maximize ( ) ( ) ( ) **, μ⋅−=− eeBzeCeB  where 
                                                 
11 Heyes (1996), Innes (1999) and Kambhu (1989), among others, present models in which fines set below 
their maximal levels are optimal. For example, in Kambhu (1989) higher penalties lead to lower 
compliance because they induce regulated firms to take actions that obstruct the enforcement process. 
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∫ −+= b
z
dttfztpz
*
)(*)(** βαμ . The first order condition with respect to the choice of e is 
given by: 
 ( )*)(*)(* 1
*
eBdxxfzxpz
z
′=−+ ∫βα  or ( )** eB′=μ  (2.4) 
which simply states that the optimal level of emissions occurs where the marginal cost 
and marginal benefit of emitting are equal. Equation (2.4) implicitly defines the firm’s 
demand for emissions, as a function of the marginal cost of emitting (given *z ), which 
we denote ( ) ( )** 1 μμ −′= Be , where ( ) ( ) 0*,0* ≥′′<′ μμ ee . Proposition 2.2 states the 
comparative static results for the optimal level of emissions, *e . 
 
Proposition 2.2 The firm’s optimal level of emissions, *e , decreases with the tax on 
reported emissions,α ; the penalty on revealed but unreported emissions, β  ; and the 
probability of audit, p. 
 
 Proposition 2.2 confirms the intuitive result that emissions decrease with 
increases in those factors that raise *μ , namely the tax, the penalty, and the frequency of 
audits. The next section considers the policymaker’s problem conditional on the firm 
responding to changes in policy parameters according to Proposition 2.2. 
 In the model of optimal regulatory policy developed below we will employ the 
fact that the firm’s optimized net benefit of emitting is ( ) ( ) ( )∫=−
*
*
**,*
c
dezeCeB
μ
μ
ρρ  
where *cμ  represents the choke price for emissions. This expression simply states that 
  73
the firm’s net benefit of emitting is the area under the firm’s demand curve for emissions 
above *μ . This is denoted area A in Figure 2.1. 
 
2.2.2 The Regulator’s Problem 
The regulator’s objective function must account for (1) the welfare loss from 
emissions in excess of the socially optimal quantity, (2) the direct benefit of information 
disclosure, and (3) the costs associated with auditing firms.  
Let m denote the per unit social cost of undisclosed emissions. Let s represent the 
difference between the unit cost of undisclosed emissions and the unit cost of disclosed 
emissions. We assume ms < , allowing for disclosure to increase the range of available 
private and public mitigation strategies and therefore decrease the social cost of 
emissions. For a particular level of disclosure, z, the per unit social cost of emissions is 
then given by szm − . 
When we assume, as we do in this section, that the regulator has complete 
information about the effectiveness of the audit process and the firm’s demand for 
emissions, he can infer the firm’s true emissions. However, this inference is no longer 
possible in a model with heterogeneity in the distribution of audit outcomes among firms, 
and incomplete information on the part of the regulator. Section 2.3 confirms that our 
main results continue to hold under these conditions. We maintain the complete 
information, homogeneous firms assumptions in this section for ease of exposition and 
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because they allow us to develop a model which is somewhat more general in other 
respects.12  
We model the situation facing the regulator as a minimization problem and 
assume his objective function, denoted V, is comprised of three terms: (1) the total 
damages from emissions net of expected taxes and fines paid by the firm; (2) 
enforcement costs; (3) the firm’s net benefit from emitting. Based on our assumptions, 
the total social cost of emissions is equal to ( ) ( )** szme −⋅μ . The firm pays expected 
taxes and fines equal to ( ) ** μμ ⋅e  .  Therefore, the total damages from emissions net of 
payments by the firm, the first component of W, is ( )[ ]*** μμ −− szme . We denote the 
cost of an audit to be w, so enforcement costs, the second component, are simply pw. As 
described earlier, the firm’s optimized net benefit from emissions is represented by 
( )∫c de
μ
μ
ρρ
*
. This is the final component of V.  
Give the three components, the regulator’s objective function is: 
( )[ ] ( )∫−+−−=
*
*
***
c
depwszmeV
μ
μ
ρρμμ  (2.5) 
We assume the regulator minimizes V with respect to his choice of α , the tax on reported 
emissions, and p, the audit probability.13 Therefore, we assume β , the marginal penalty 
                                                 
12 In particular, the model with heterogeneous firms developed later relies on assuming linear demand for 
emissions among firms to obtain comparable results. 
13 In modeling the policy choices available to the regulator we have not allowed the regulator to choose a 
deposit-refund instrument in lieu of a tax. Swierzbinski (1994) finds a deposit-refund system to be optimal 
in a model of regulation with self reporting. However, as discussed earlier, the role of self reporting in 
Swierzbinski’s model is quite different than in ours because it arises as a result of the regulator’s 
uncertainty about a firm’s pollution abatement costs (absent any direct benefits of disclosure). A deposit-
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on revealed but unreported emissions, is exogenous. In the context of our model the 
regulator would always do best to set this penalty as high as possible because doing so 
achieves the highest compliance given any tax with the least enforcement costs. This 
fairly standard result leads us to simply assume that the regulator faces some constraint 
on the magnitude of the penalty that can be imposed.14  
 The first order conditions for an interior solution to the regulator’s problem are 
given by: 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) αμμα
μμα ∂
∂=−−∂
∂′⇔=∂
∂ ******0 zseszmeV . (2.6) 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) wszm
p
e
p
zse
p
V =−−∂
∂′−∂
∂⇔=∂
∂ μμμμ *****0 . (2.7) 
 
Equation (2.6) indicates that the regulator chooses *α  to equate the marginal benefit of a 
higher tax (lower emissions) with the marginal cost of a higher tax (less truthful 
reporting). Similarly equation (2.7) illustrates that p* equates the marginal benefit of 
increase audit frequency (greater disclosure and reduced emissions) and the marginal cost 
(additional audit resources, w).  
 Both a higher tax and higher audit probability achieve greater internalization of 
social costs (and thus a reduction in emissions), but each is costly in a different way. A 
                                                                                                                                                 
refund scheme would not be optimal in general in our context because it raises the enforcement cost of 
internalizing social damages. Although a deposit-refund scheme could be optimal in our context under 
certain conditions, we’ve chosen to constrain the regulator to using a Pigovian tax both for simplicity and 
because deposit-refund mechanisms are not broadly utilized in environmental regulation (particularly in the 
U.S., see EPA (2001)) 
14 See, for example, Becker (1968) and Harrington (1988). This assumption can also be grounded in the 
argument that the marginal penalty may include factors which are outside the regulator’s control such as 
the market’s reaction to news that a firm underreported its actual emissions or explicit fines and increased 
liability resulting from an independent judiciary process (Garvie and Keeler (1994)). 
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higher tax reduces disclosure, which is costly when disclosure has direct benefits. A 
higher audit probability is directly costly as more resources are devoted to enforcement. 
To understand the interplay between these choices, consider the two extreme cases 
regarding the value of disclosure. First, suppose disclosure has no direct benefit so 0=s . 
In this case there is no interior solution on ; it is optimal to set βα p≥*  (in which case 
the firm discloses nothing). This achieves the greatest internalization of social costs 
(arising entirely through fines rather than taxes) with the least expenditure on 
enforcement. The optimal audit probability, p*, will reflect the marginal benefit of 
reduced emissions resulting from internalization relative to the marginal cost of auditing, 
and an interior solution will exist for w sufficiently large. At the other extreme, suppose 
that once emissions are disclosed, they are no longer socially harmful so ms = .  In such 
a case the optimal policy involves zero tax on reported emissions. Full compliance with 
the disclosure requirement can then be achieved with a negligible audit probability. 
Although this extreme case may seem unrealistic, it conveys important intuition: as s 
approaches m the optimal policy may be minimal taxation and infrequent auditing. 
Auditing is costly for the regulator and high compliance rates can still be achieved with a 
low probability of audit when the tax on reported emissions is also low. 
An interior solution in both dimensions of the regulator’s choice will exist if s is 
sufficiently large but strictly less than m (i.e., the costs of emissions are sufficiently 
reduced but not completely eliminated by disclosure) and if the cost of auditing, w, is 
sufficiently large.  We henceforth assume this is the case and focus our analysis on the 
comparative statics at an interior solution.  
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Proposition 2.3. The regulator’s optimal tax, *α , is increasing in m, the per unit social 
cost of undisclosed emissions and decreasing in s, the difference between the per unit 
social costs of undisclosed and disclosed emissions. The optimal audit probability p* is 
decreasing in the cost of auditing, w.  
 
 The comparative static results regarding the optimal tax are broadly intuitive. The 
regulator trades-off internalizing social costs with a higher tax against the consequent 
reduction in disclosure; the more valuable is disclosure (due to higher s), the lower the 
optimal tax. Conversely, the more socially costly all emissions are (as represented by m), 
the higher the optimal tax in order to achieve greater internalization of these costs and 
lower resulting emissions. The effect of the cost of auditing, w, on *α is ambiguous. A 
higher cost of auditing, w, does not directly affect the optimal tax but will of course 
reduce the optimal audit probability, p*. Whether the optimal tax increases or decreases 
with an increase in w depends on how the decrease in the audit probability affects the 
marginal benefit and cost of the tax. The expression for  
w∂
∂ *α  is provided in the 
appendix.  
  Unlike the comparative statics for the optimal tax, the directions of the effects of 
m and s on the optimal audit frequency are in general ambiguous. Consider first the effect 
of m. As the social cost of emissions rises (holding constant the reduction that occurs due 
to disclosure, s) the marginal benefit of reducing emissions by internalizing their cost to 
the firm rises. For this reason it seems intuitive that that the optimal audit probability 
would rise as well, since raising p increases the internalized cost of emitting. However, 
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an increase in m increases the optimal tax *α as stated in Proposition 2.3. This in turn 
increases *μ  and reduces emissions ceteris paribus. A reduction in emissions reduces 
the marginal benefit of achieving a higher percentage of emissions disclosure. This 
reduces the value of auditing with regards to achieving higher rates of disclosure. If the 
firm’s elasticity of demand for emissions is very high, then the optimal response to an 
increase in m may be to raise the tax to reduce emissions but reduce the audit probability. 
The comparative static result shows that we cannot exclude the possibility that 0* <∂
∂
m
p . 
However, were the regulator restricted to choosing only p, with  α  fixed, then we find 
unambiguously 0* >∂
∂
m
p .  
 The ambiguity of the effect of an increase in s on the optimal audit probability is 
more easily understood. An increase in s has opposing effects on the value of auditing. A 
higher s increases the value of disclosure, which increases the marginal benefit of 
auditing. However, the higher s decreases the value of forcing the firm to internalize the 
social costs of its emissions because the higher s reduces the social cost of emissions and 
increases the socially optimal quantity of emissions. This decreases the marginal benefit 
of auditing. Either effect may dominate. The expression which determines the sign of 
s
p
∂
∂ * is stated in the appendix.  
 
2.3  Heterogeneous Firms and Incomplete Information 
 Our model in the previous section assumes a single firm representative of a 
homogeneous industry, and complete information on the part of the regulator. While 
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these assumptions greatly simplify the analytics of our model, they also imply that the 
regulator can infer the firm’s actual emissions.15 In this section, we discuss the issues 
arising from inference of emissions levels, and relax our assumptions to allow for firm 
heterogeneity and incomplete information.  
 Any model that captures the trade-off faced by a regulator between reducing 
emissions and eliciting truthful disclosure of emissions must entail the regulator’s 
forming some inference regarding firms’ behavior. That is, the regulator must infer actual 
emissions and the extent to which firms’ disclosures are untruthful in order to evaluate 
the marginal benefits and costs of policy changes that affect actual emissions and 
disclosure. This leads to something of a paradox: why does the regulator value disclosure 
if he can infer how much a firm will emit? 
 Most fundamentally, we argue that the reduction of social costs arising from a 
firm’s disclosure of emissions is different from what can be achieved from inferring their 
presence. While we model disclosed emissions simply as a quantity, in practice emissions 
disclosure is likely to involve additional, directly beneficial but difficult to infer 
information involving the nature of emissions, the time and location of releases, etc.16 
                                                 
15 Optimal regulatory policy in the context of the tradeoff between deterring emissions and eliciting truthful 
disclosure is, of course, determined at the margin. Assuming, as we do in section 2.2, that the regulator has 
complete information about the firm’s demand for emissions and about the firm’s incentives to truthfully 
disclose (arising from the effectiveness and probability of audits) implies that the regulator also knows 
exactly what level of actual emissions is optimal for the firm, in addition to knowing what percentage of 
emissions the firm will optimally disclose. However, the model can be thought of as simply a framework 
for understanding how a regulator would evaluate policy choices at the margin. In applying the model what 
is required is that the regulator form beliefs regarding how the truthfulness of disclosure and cost of 
emitting are affected at the margin by the policy parameters, and how the level of emissions is affected by 
the cost of emitting (i.e., the elasticity of demand for emissions). A regulator may well be able to estimate 
these marginal responses without actually having complete information. For example, the regulator may be 
able to estimate the elasticity of demand for emissions without knowing the entirety of the demand curve. 
16 This suggests several possible extensions that are beyond the scope of the current analysis.  For example, 
one could permit firms to report more detailed information about the characteristics of their emissions and 
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The ability to mitigate the harm caused by emissions is likely to be very sensitive to these 
specific details, perhaps most importantly the immediate knowledge of a release (or even 
prior knowledge in the case of planned releases). A regulator’s belief (or even certainty) 
that a firm is emitting more than it discloses may very well be insufficient to enable 
mitigation. Furthermore, the regulator presumably could not act to penalize the firm 
based on inferred emissions since penalties could not be legally enforced on inferred 
emissions that have not actually been revealed by the audit. 
 The representative firm model employed in section 2.2 implies that the regulator’s 
inference is applicable to a specific firm. We develop a more general model here which 
entails firm heterogeneity. In this framework the regulator forms inference regarding 
aggregate industry emissions and average disclosure behavior, but cannot infer any 
specific firm’s emissions level. This allows meaningful analysis of policy tradeoffs but 
enhances the distinction between disclosed and inferred emissions. In such a context it is 
clear that the disclosure of emissions by individual firms would enable mitigation of 
social costs that could not be achieved by inference regarding aggregate industry 
emissions. We show that in an industry with heterogeneous firms, in which the regulator 
is able to infer only average industry emissions, the main results of our model continue to 
hold.  
                                                                                                                                                 
allow the social cost of disclosed emissions to vary with the nature of the information. As noted by an 
anonymous reviewer, one could also consider a model in which undiscovered and un-inferred emissions are 
most costly, followed by undiscovered but inferred emissions, and finally disclosed emissions. Both 
extensions would add additional complexity (and choice variables for the firm and regulator). However, the 
general insights from the model would remain largely unchanged. 
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 Assume that each firm has private information, represented by the parameter k, 
regarding the distribution of audit outcomes if it is audited.17 That is, if an audit occurs it 
reveals a quantity of emissions equal to ( )kue +⋅  where u is a random variable with 
probability density function ( )uf  and cumulative distribution function ( )uF  on the 
interval [ ]dd +− 1,1 . We assume ( )uf  is unimodal and symmetric around 1. The value of 
k varies across firms and the regulator knows only the distribution of k, denoted ( )kG  
with support ],[ εε− . The expected value of k is assumed to be zero so that on average 
across firms audits are unbiased. An additional assumption, that 1<+ εd , is required to 
obtain an interior solution on z. 
 An individual firm’s objective remains unchanged—choose the report, z, and 
emissions, e, to maximize the expected net benefits of emitting: 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ⎪⎭
⎪⎬⎫⎪⎩
⎪⎨⎧ ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ −++− ∫
−
duufzkupzeeBMax
d
kz
ze
βα
,
. 
Assuming an interior solution, we can solve the first order condition on z to obtain an 
expression for *z : 
 k
p
Fz +⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −= − β
α1* 1 . (2.8) 
Given *z , the first order condition on e can be stated as follows: 
 ( ) ( ) ( )*'**
*
eBduufzkupz
d
kz
=−++ ∫
−
βα  or ( )*'* eB=μ  
                                                 
17 There are several other ways in which we might add firm heterogeneity. For example, we could assume 
that firms differ in their perceived penalties for non-reporting or in their probabilities of being found 
noncompliant as in Innes (2000). We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting these possibilities to us. 
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where ( ) ( )duufzkupz d
kz
∫
−
−++=
*
*** βαμ  denotes the marginal cost of emitting given 
the optimal report. The form of firm heterogeneity we have introduced enters the model 
fairly simply; the firm-specific audit parameter simply shifts the optimal report, z*. The 
unit-cost of emissions, *, for a particular firm depends both directly on k and on the 
resulting z* (with * of course increasing in k). Note however that taking expectations 
across the industry [ ] ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −= − β
α
p
FzE 1* 1  and [ ] [ ] [ ]( )
[ ]
( )duufzEupzEE d
zE
∫ −+=
*
*** βαμ . 
The fact that the expected values of these key firm choice variable parallel the 
expressions for z* and * in the representative firm model of section 2.2 will enable us 
to model the optimal policy of the regulator very similarly. The effects of policy 
parameters on [ ]*zE  and [ ]*μE  (and therefore expected or average total emissions) 
precisely parallel the results for the representative firm model on z* and * described in 
Propositions 2.1 and 2.2. 
Before turning our attention to the problem facing the regulator, note that the 
regulator is unable to infer a particular firm’s true emissions, *e , in this context. To see 
this, let *x  represent the level of emissions the firm (optimally) reports to the regulator 
where 
( )*1*** 1 μβ
α ek
p
Fezx ⋅⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ +⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −== −      (2.9) 
  83
with ( ) ( )duufzkupz d
kz
∫
−
−++=
*
*** βαμ . The presence of k in the above expression 
breaks the inference—each *x  value is associated with more than one value of k.18 To 
understand the intuition, consider two firms, one with a high value of k (audits are biased 
against it) and one with a low value of k (audits are biased in its favor). The firm with the 
high value of k will report a higher percentage of its emissions, *z ,  but will emit less 
because its cost of emitting*, will be higher. The firm with the low value of k will 
report a smaller share of actual emissions but will emit more. Because the level of 
emissions reported to the regulator is given by the product of *z  and *e , both firms 
could report the same *x  thus breaking the inference.19 While the regulator is unable to 
infer a particular firm’s emissions based on its report, he can still infer average emissions 
since he knows the expected value of k. 
 When firms are heterogeneous and the regulator has incomplete information, the 
regulator is assumed to choose the optimal tax and audit probability based on his 
knowledge of expected (or average) firm behavior. This is, the regulator minimizes 
expected value of the social welfare function described in Section 2.2: 
                                                 
18 Consider the case where the demand for emissions is linear: μcae −= . With a linear demand for 
emissions, [ ]*1* 1 μβ
α cak
p
Fx −⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ +⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −= − . The following two values of k yield the same value of *x : 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
*2
*4
1,
*2
*4
1
2
1
2
1
x
xccaca
p
F
x
xccaca
p
Fk −
−−+−+⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −−−
−−+−−⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −−= −− αγγβ
ααγγ
β
α  
where ( )∫
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −
−
−
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −−≡
b
p
F
duuf
p
Fup
β
α β
αβγ
1
1
1
1 . 
19 More generally, a firm’s reported level of emissions will not be a monotonic function of its k parameter. 
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 ( ) ( )[ ] ( )
⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡ −+−−= ∫
*
*
***
c
depwszmeEWE
μ
μ
ρρμμ . 
This problem is made far more tractable by assuming each firm faces linear demand for 
emissions: 
 ( ) ** μμ cae −= . 
Given this assumption, the regulator’s objective function becomes:  
 ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧ ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −−−+−−−= *1*
2
1*** μμμμ
cc
acapwszmcaEWE  
The regulator minimizes ( )WE  with respect to his choices of the tax, α , and audit 
probability, p. The fact that the respective forms of [ ]*zE  and [ ]*μE  resemble those of  
z* and m* in the homogeneous firm model, together with linearity of demand, makes the 
solution to the regulator’s problem in this context closely parallel that discussed in 
section 2.2. In particular, the comparative static results obtained for an interior solution to 
the regulators’ problem hold with heterogeneous firm of the type modeled here. These 
results are formalized in the appendix.  
 
2.4 Conclusion 
 When information disclosure has direct social benefits but is costly for a firm and 
enforcement is costly and imperfect a regulator must confront the competing objectives 
of inducing disclosure and internalizing social costs. This tension is clearly present in 
many environmental regulatory contexts where the harm from emissions can be mitigated 
if potentially impacted parties have better information about the nature and quantity of 
emissions. It also exists in other regulatory settings such as product safety regulation. 
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Disclosure of product defects and hazards has direct social benefits, but it is desirable that 
firms face a cost (either liability or fines) when their products cause harm in order to 
induce care. 
 There are certainly many avenues for future work in this area. One could 
imagine two policymakers, one of whom chooses a tax and the other the audit probability 
(e.g., legislature and executive or regulatory agency) but who have different objective 
functions and interact strategically. A regulator may have other policy instruments at his 
discretion, including choosing the audit probability for a firm in a dynamic setting based 
on past behavior. One also might consider an endogenous audit process in which the 
probability of audit is a decreasing function of disclosed emissions. We have not modeled 
the choice between putting enforcement resources into more frequent audits or more 
effective audits. Clearly a regulator must achieve an optimal balance, and the model 
we’ve developed could provide a framework for exploring this issue. We have assumed 
that disclosure costs (tax) and penalties are constant per unit, and that audit effectiveness 
is independent of firm size or total emissions. Relaxing these assumptions significantly 
complicates the analysis, but could inform important issues regarding how regulation 
affects industry structure. 
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Figure 16 Firm’s inverse demand for emissions 
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A. Proofs for Section 2.2 
 
Proof of Proposition 2.1: 
Define β
αυ
p
−≡1 . The comparative static results for 
( )υβ
α 11 1* −− =⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −= F
p
Fz  where ( )⋅F  is monotonically increasing in its augment and 
βα p<  for an interior solution are given by: 
 ( ) 0*
11* <⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛−=∂
∂
zfp
z
βα        (2.A1) 
 ( ) 0*
1*
2 >⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛==∂
∂
zfpp
z
β
α        (2.A2) 
 ( ) 0*
1*
2 >⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛=∂
∂
zfp
z
β
α
β        (2.A3) 
 
Proof of Proposition 2.2: 
The second order condition for minimization is satisfied: ( ) 0* >′′− eB .  The 
comparative static results for e are derived implicitly.   
( ) 0*
** <′′=∂
∂
eB
ze
α         (2.A4) 
( ) ( ) ( ) 0**
*
*
<−′′=∂
∂ ∫
b
z
dttfzt
eBp
e β        (2.A5) 
( ) ( ) ( ) 0**
*
*
<−′′=∂
∂ ∫b
z
dttfzt
eB
pe
β        (2.A6) 
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Proof of Proposition 2.3: 
The elements of the Hessian for the policymaker’s problem are: 
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The following second order effects are necessary to compute the comparative 
static results of interest: 
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We begin with the comparative static results for the optimal tax on reported 
emissions, denoted *α . 
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The comparative static result for w on *α  is generally ambiguous: 
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Given 0>SOC , the sign of 
w∂
∂ *α  equals the sign of 12f , which is given as equation 
(2.A9) above. 
We now derive the comparative static results for the optimal audit probability, 
*p . The comparative static result for w on *p  is given by: 
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The signs of 
m
p
∂
∂ *  and 
s
p
∂
∂ *  are generally ambiguous. The respective expressions follow: 
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B. Proofs for Section 2.3 
Below, we reexamine the model presented in Section 2.2 relaxing the 
homogeneous firms and perfect information assumptions.  Consider first the problem 
facing a representative firm, among many heterogeneous firms. The firm’s reported 
emissions are denoted by ez . The emissions revealed by audit are ( )kuex +⋅= , where 
k represents the firm’s individual characteristic that is unknown to the regulator. k is 
defined on the support ],[ εε− with mean zero. u is a random variable with probability 
density function ( )uf  on the interval [ ]dd +− 1,1 . ( )uf  is unimodal and symmetric 
around 1. The firm is found underreporting if ezx > . The expected level of 
underreporting for a representative firm is 
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The firm’s objective function is then 
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The first order conditions for an interior solution on e and z are given respectively by: 
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Solving (2.B1) for *z yields 
k
p
Fz +⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −= − β
α1* 1 .  
Because k is a constant, the comparative static results on z* are the same as in the 
homogenous firm model (see equations (2.A1) through (2.A3) above).  
The comparative static results on *e  are given as follows: 
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Now consider the regulator’s problem when firms’ demands for emissions are 
linear and given by ( ) μμ cae −= .  Given incomplete information on k, the regulator now 
minimizes, ( )WE , with respect to his choices of α  and p where 
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the optimal report, z*. 
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where ( )kVar  denotes the variance of the random variable k. 
After substituting the above expressions into ( )WE , we can write the first order 
conditions for an interior solution as: 
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The second order effects follow. Each expression includes a comparison between 
the second order effect in the heterogeneous firm model (denoted by g’s), and the 
associated second order effect that would obtain in the homogeneous firm model 
assuming linear demand for emissions (denoted by f ’s). The latter model is a special 
case of the more general model in Section 2.2 of the paper (see equations (2.A10) 
through (2.A15) for the second order effects with a more general demand function). 
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We now state the comparative static results for the regulator’s choice variables in 
the heterogeneous firms, incomplete information model. 
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3.1 Introduction 
Firm compliance with environmental regulations has been the focus of numerous 
empirical studies in environmental policy analysis. Current literature examines 
environmental enforcement and compliance from various perspectives. To date, the 
majority of the empirical literature has focused on a single media program, such as Clean 
Air Act (CAA), Clean Water Act (CWA), Resource Conservation and Recovery Act 
(RCRA), etc.1 However, in practice many firms are regulated under more than one 
environmental program. For example, in the state of Michigan, among a total of 51,381 
facilities registered under EPA’s Facility Registration System (FRS), 1796 facilities are 
regulated under both CAA and RCRA and 517 are regulated under both CWA and 
RCRA. For firms regulated under multiple programs, an important question is: do stricter 
regulations under one program increase, decrease or have no effect on firm compliance 
with another program? 
This paper endeavors to answer the above question by examining firm compliance 
behavior under multiple programs. When a firm is regulated under multiple programs, the 
relationships among these environmental regulations can be substituting, complementary 
or independent. Complementary (substituting) regulations arise when increasing the 
enforcement intensity under one program causes the firm to increase (decrease) its 
abatement under other programs and hence results in higher (lower) compliance under 
other programs. When regulations are not independent, optimal monitoring and 
enforcement strategies require coordination between the two programs. Consider the 
                                                 
1 Cohen (1998) and Cohen (2000) provide literature reviews of empirical works on environmental 
monitoring and enforcement.   
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situation where an increase in a firm’s abatement level under one program reduces its 
marginal abatement cost under the other program. Then changes in the enforcement 
intensity that result in higher abatement level under one program reduce the marginal 
abatement cost under the other program. As a result, the firm’s optimal abatement level 
and hence its compliance under the other program increases, although the enforcement 
parameters under that program remain unchanged. If policymakers ignore the 
complementarity among regulations and choose monitoring and enforcement strategies 
independently, the resulting abatement levels may be in excess of the socially optimal 
levels. Following the same reasoning, substituting regulations also call for coordination 
among programs that regulate the same firm; otherwise, there will be insufficient 
abatement compared to the social optimum.  
 The purpose of this paper is to uncover both the existence and nature of spillover 
effects that one regulatory program places on another regulatory program. Previous 
studies are suggestive. Firms may substitute away from one type of emissions to another 
due to technological change or optimization strategies during production. For example, 
Botre et al. (2007) show that technological innovation in automotive catalytic converters 
results in lower nitrogen oxides but increased ozone.  Sigman (1996) and Gamper-
Rabindran (2006) find that a single regulation can lead firms to transfer pollutants from a 
regulated medium such as air to a different medium such as landfill or water.2 These 
studies suggest substitution-inducing regulations (or negative externalities), but do not 
                                                 
2 Alberini (2001) also addresses substitution, but from a different perspective. She examines the 
relationship between underground and aboveground storage tanks for petroleum products and hazardous 
substances due to extensive regulations on underground storage. She finds that following the regulations, 
the relationship becomes substituting. 
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explicitly consider simultaneous regulatory programs. In contrast, this paper tests for 
potential substitution in compliance across programs.  
 Empirically, complementary regulations are also possible. For example, installing 
new abatement equipment or expanding current environmental pollution controls to 
accommodate the requirements of one program may also help the firm control other 
emissions. It could be that new personnel provide expertise in pollution control in general 
that benefits abatement of emissions under other programs. Enforcement of one program 
may also induce firms to adopt cleaner inputs for production or upgrade manufacturing 
processes in ways that reduce emissions in general. Thus, actions taken to reduce 
emissions under one program may have spillover effects such that they also reduce 
emissions regulated under other programs. The result is higher penalties or inspection 
frequencies under one regulatory program induce firms to reduce emissions under the 
other programs. The existing literature provides evidence of complementarities across 
firms induced by a single environmental program (see Shimshack and Ward, 2005, 2008, 
and Decker and Pope, 2005), but it does not address across-program spillovers for 
individual firms.  
 The theoretical model developed in this paper considers a representative firm 
regulated under two programs, i.e., two pollutants, and allows for abatement of one 
pollutant to have positive, negative or zero impacts on the marginal abatement cost for 
the other pollutant. Comparative statics results show that firms respond to more stringent 
regulations in one program by increasing abatement and thus the compliance rate within 
the same program. However, across programs, the effects of changes in the regulatory 
parameters of one program on the compliance of the other program are ambiguous. If 
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changes in one abatement level lead to lower (higher) marginal abatement cost under the 
other program, then regulations are said to be complements (substitutes); otherwise, 
regulations are independent.    
 The empirical work focuses on facilities in Michigan that are regulated under both 
RCRA and CAA. A probit model with censoring is used to estimate the impacts on 
RCRA compliance of penalties and inspections under both RCRA and CAA. The results 
confirm that increasing RCRA penalties or inspection probability increases the 
compliance rate within the same program. Cross-program effects turn out to be positive. 
That is, increasing CAA penalties and enforcement rates also leads to a higher 
compliance rate under RCRA. This provides evidence of a complementary relationship 
between the two programs.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the theoretical 
model of firm compliance decisions under multiple regulations. Section 3 discusses the 
data and Section 4 presents the empirical model. Results and interpretations are given in 
Section 5. Section 6 concludes. 
 
3.2 Theoretical Model 
 A polluting firm is regulated under two environmental programs, denoted m  and 
n . The regulations take the form of standards, denoted ms  and ns  respectively, on the 
firm’s total emissions of the regulated pollutant. Emissions exceeding the standards are 
penalized with per unit fine, mf  and nf , respectively. The firm faces inspection 
probabilities mq  and nq , respectively. The firm chooses the levels of abatement for the 
  107
two pollutants. Let ia  denote the abatement level, ie  the level of emissions in the absence 
of regulation, and ie  the intended emissions after abatement, where nmi ,= . It is 
assumed that there is measurement errors associated with the inspection process, denoted 
iv , so that the firms realized emissions are iiii vaee +−= . Then iiii veea +−= . The 
abatement cost for the firm is ( )nm aac , , with 
i
i a
cc ∂
∂≡ , 2
2
i
ii a
cc ∂
∂≡  and all being positive.  
As I show below, complementary or substitution relationships between the two regulatory 
programs arise when abatement of one pollutant affects the marginal abatement cost of 
another pollutant or when 0
2
≠∂∂
∂≡
nm
mn aa
cc .  
(1) When 0<mnc , increasing abatement of one pollutant reduces the marginal 
abatement cost of the other, and 
(2)  when 0>mnc , increasing abatement of one pollutant increases the marginal 
abatement cost of the other.  
Given the standard, is , the probability that the firm is out of compliance with 
regulation i is denoted ( )ii aP , where, 0' <iP , 0'' <iP , ( ) 10 =iP   and ( ) 0lim =∞→ iia aPj .3 
Define the firm’s expected total cost, ( )nm aag , , to be the sum of abatement costs and 
expected penalties. It follows that  
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( )nnnnnnnnmmmmmmmmnmnm svaeaPqfsvaeaPqfaacaag −+−+−+−+= ,,
 (3.1) 
                                                 
3 To ensure the probability ( )ii aP  is differentiable, it is assumed that the firm cannot completely eliminate 
the potential of violation due to measurement errors associated with inspection process. 
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The firm chooses abatement levels ma  and na  to minimize ( )nm aag , . Assuming 
an interior solution, the associated first order conditions can be rearranged to yield:  
( ) ( ) )( *'** mmmmmmmmmmmm aPsaeqfaPqfc −−−=     (3.2) 
( ) ( ) )(, *'** nnnnnnnnnnnnn aPsaeqfsaPqfc −−−= .    (3.3) 
where * denotes the optimal abatement levels. The left- and right-hand sides of 
expressions (2) and (3) represent the marginal costs and expected marginal benefits of 
abatement effort respectively.  
 The relationship between the two regulatory programs m  and n  are derived from 
the comparative static results for penalties (f) and inspections (q). The main results are 
stated as Proposition 3.1 and the proof is given in Appendix 3.A.  
 
Proposition 3.1 Assuming an interior solution for the firm’s optimization problem, the 
comparative statics with respect to penalties if  and inspections iq  are: 
(i) 0>
i
i
df
da
 and 0>
i
i
dq
da
 for nmi ,= ; 
(ii) Sign (
j
i
df
da
)=-sign( mnc ) and sign (
j
i
dq
da
)=-sign( mnc ), where },{, nmji ∈ with ji ≠ . 
Proposition 3.1 describes the effects of changes in penalties and inspections on 
abatement levels under the two programs. I refer to the impacts of enforcement 
parameters on abatement (and hence compliance) under the same program as within 
program effects and the impacts of enforcement parameters in one program on abatement 
(and hence compliance) under the other program as cross-program effects. Statement (i) 
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in Proposition 3.1 indicates that, as expected, within program effects are positive. An 
increase in enforcement intensity under regulation i, from either an increased fine or 
increased inspection probability, increases abatement of pollutant i. Statement (ii) refers 
to cross-program effects. When mnc  is negative (positive), so that regulations are 
complements (substitutes), then an increase in the enforcement parameters for program i  
increases (decreases) abatement for program j  for ji ≠ . More importantly, the result 
suggests that the sign of mnc  can be inferred from the cross-program effects. That is, 
00 <⇒> mn
j
i c
df
da
 and 00 >⇒< mn
j
i c
df
da
. In addition, if 0=
j
i
df
da
and therefore 0=mnc , 
then enforcement parameters in one program have no effect on the abatement level in the 
other program. 
 Given theory does not offer guidance as to the expected direction for cross-
program effects, I propose an empirical model that provides an indirect test of the 
implications of Proposition 3.1 in section 4.  The theory implies the following testable 
hypothesis: 
 
Null Hypothesis 1: The within program effects are positive.  
Null Hypothesis 2: The cross-program effects are zero.  
 
 Hypothesis 2 tests the changes in abatement under one program in response to 
changes in enforcement parameters under the other program. Under the null hypothesis, 
changes in penalty and enforcement under one program have no effect on firm’s 
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abatement and compliance under the other program. If the null hypothesis is rejected, 
then it indicates that the two programs are correlated. Specifically, positive cross-
program effects imply 0<mnc  and hence the programs are complementary. On the other 
hand, if the cross-program effects are negative, then 0>mnc  and regulations are 
substitutes. 
 
3.3 Data  
 This study focuses on facilities in the state of Michigan that are jointly subject to 
hazardous waste (RCRA) and air (CAA) regulations. The major data source is EPA’s 
Enforcement and Compliance History Online (ECHO). The ECHO data track compliance 
histories of EPA-regulated facilities as well as inspection and enforcement actions taken 
against the facilities under air, water and hazardous waste programs. Compliance and 
enforcement data for facilities in ECHO is recorded each quarter and is available for the 
most recent three years. Therefore, this study covers the time period from the third 
quarter of 2006 to the first quarter of 2008.  
 While determining facilities that are regulated under both CAA and RCRA, I find 
that some facilities cannot be identified uniquely by CAA ID number or RCRA ID 
number. For example, a single ID under CAA can be matched to multiple IDs under 
RCRA according to EPA’s facility registration system. Since there is no other 
identification method to aggregate the multiple RCRA IDs, I treat each RCRA ID as a 
unique facility although they share the same CAA information.  Similarly, there are cases 
where a unique ID under RCRA are assigned multiple IDs under CAA. I also treat the 
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multiple CAA IDs as unique facilities. Therefore each facility in the analysis is jointly 
identified by CAA and RCRA ID. Since government facilities are essentially different 
from private facilities in terms of their operation and objective function, they are 
excluded from the analysis. The analysis include a total of 1148 facilities with 
enforcement and compliance history over 12 quarters.  
 The ECHO database is also linked to several other databases available through 
EPA, including the Facility Registration System (FRS) database, the Aerometric 
Information Retrieval System (AIRS) Facility Subsystem database and the RCRAInfo 
database. These databases provide information about the other environmental programs 
under which the facility is regulated and facility characteristics that are related to these 
two programs.  
 In addition, community characteristics are included in the analysis to control for 
the potential influence of community pressures on firm behavior. Specifically, I include 
the percentage of urban population, percentage of white population, per capita income 
and median housing values at the county level all obtained from the 2000 United States 
Census. 
 
3.4 Econometric model 
The empirical analysis focuses on the within program effects under RCRA and 
the cross-program effects of CAA enforcement parameters on compliance with RCRA. 
Under RCRA, facilities are inspected on a regular basis, although violations causing 
damage to human health or the environment may be self-reported or reported by third 
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parties. Thus, compliance status is available only when a facility is inspected under 
RCRA and the empirical analysis must control for this censoring.  
 Let *kY   denote the latent variable representing a facility’s net benefit from 
complying with RCRA, where k denotes the facility. Define kY  to be the corresponding 
compliance dummy variable such that 1=kY  (facility complies) when 0* >kY  and 
0=kY  (facility does not comply) otherwise. Denote the net benefit to the regulator of 
inspecting facility k by *kI  and the corresponding dummy variable under RCRA by 
kI such that 1=kI  (facility is inspected) if 0* >kI  and 0=kI  (facility is not inspected) 
otherwise. kY  is observed only when 1=kI . Thus the empirical model is a Heckman-
type probit model that includes the following two equations: 
kkk zY εβ += '*          (3.4) 
kkk uxI += α'* ,         (3.5) 
with the corresponding dummy variables, 
⎩⎨
⎧ >=
otherwise
Yif
Y kk 0
01 **  and is observed only when 1=kI  
⎩⎨
⎧ >=
otherwise
Iif
I kk 0
01 ** . 
The error terms in the model are assumed to follow bivariate normal distribution such 
that  
( )Σ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
,0~ N
uk
kε ,  
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where ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡=Σ
1
1
12
12
σ
σ
. 
 In equation (3.4), the compliance equation, 'kz  represents facility-specific 
variables that impact its decisions to comply with RCRA, and β  is the corresponding 
parameter vector to be estimated. In equation (3.5), the inspection equation,  'kx  includes 
factors that affect the inspection probability for a facility while α  is the corresponding 
parameter vector to be estimated. 
Variables representing penalties and inspections under the two regulations, RCRA 
and CAA, are included as explanatory variables in the compliance equation. The 
coefficients of the RCRA enforcement parameters represent within program effects. 
According to the theoretical model developed in section 2, these effects are expected to 
be positive. The cross-program effects are represented by the coefficients of CAA 
enforcement parameters in the compliance equation. If these cross-program effects are 
positive, then a higher penalty or inspection probability under CAA leads to more 
compliance under RCRA. This implies a complementary relationship between the 
programs. A similar rationale follows for negative cross-program effects, which implies a 
substitution relationship. Zero cross-program effects are consistent with evidence of 
independence between the programs. 
 Although the data are collected as panel data, they are treated as pooled cross-
sectional data. For pooled cross-sectional data, observations for the same facility over 
different periods are correlated and thus the option CLUSTER in Stata is used to control 
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for within groups (facilities) correlation. In addition, standard errors are calculated using 
robust White's (1982) covariance estimator4.  
 Table 3.1 provides variable descriptions and summary statistics. The first two 
variables are the dependent variables in the binary probit model. The compliance rate for 
inspection facilities under RCRA is around 0.46. 5 The mean inspection rate under RCRA 
is as low as 0.02. In anticipating the lagged effects of monitoring and enforcement, the 
amount of penalties and number of inspections lagged one year and two years are 
included. They are the set of variables from RCRA inspection 1 to CAA penalty 2. The 
average number of inspections lagged two years is higher under RCRA with a difference 
of 0.08, but the average number of inspections in the past 4 quarters is slightly higher 
under CAA. On the other hand, the average penalty under CAA is higher than that under 
RCRA.  
 The dummy variables, MACT, PSD, NSPS, TRI and NEI, identify other 
environmental programs to which the facility is subject. Industry differences are captured 
broadly using the variable Manufacturing. Facilities with 2 digit SIC codes between 20 
and 39 are classified as manufacturing and 73% of facilities in the sample are classified 
as manufacturing. The set of variables from CEG to Managed 2005 controls for other 
RCRA-related characteristics of the facility. Facility size is represented by number of 
employees. The remaining variables in Table 3.1 are selected to control for community 
characteristics.    
                                                 
4 See Rogers (1993) and Williams (2000) for details. 
5 With 1148 facilities over a period of 12 quarters, a total of 236 inspections were carried out by the EPA 
and the state regulators.  
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3.5 Results 
 The primary estimation results of the probit model are shown in Table 3.2. 
Important parameters of interests are those related to past penalties and inspections. In 
RCRA compliance equation, five out of the eight enforcement parameters are positive 
and significant, including RCRA penalty 2, RCRA inspection 2, CAA penalty 2, CAA 
penalty 1, and CAA inspection 1. These variables are sufficient to test the two hypotheses 
stated in Section 3. First, given the positive and significant effects of RCRA enforcement 
parameters (penalty and inspection) on RCRA compliance, the within program effects are 
positive and thus Hypothesis 1 cannot be rejected. Second, three of the CAA enforcement 
parameters are positive and significant but none are significantly negative, suggesting 
that higher penalties and more enforcement actions under CAA in the past two years lead 
to higher compliance rate with RCRA. This provides evidence to reject Hypothesis 2 and 
thus compliance decisions under the two programs are correlated. In addition, the positive 
cross-program effects also imply a complementary relationship between the two 
programs for the same facilities. These within program and cross-program effects suggest 
that a facility’s compliance is affected by not only enforcement parameters within the 
same program but also those from the other program.  
 The finding of a complementary relationship between the two programs bears 
important policy implications. Complementary regulations imply that for a regulator, the 
benefit of increasing monitoring and enforcement of one program is not confined to the 
reduced emissions or increased compliance under the same program. The benefit of 
increased compliance under other programs should also be considered when evaluating 
the effectiveness of monitoring and enforcement.  
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 To better interpret the within program and cross-program effects, marginal effects 
for significant variables are calculated and reported in Table 3.3 in the attached appendix. 
The marginal effects considered here are the changes in the univariate unconditional 
probability of compliance with RCRA when one of the enforcement parameters 
increases, holding everything else constant.  
 The marginal effect of RCRA penalty 2 is 0.023, meaning that increasing RCRA 
penalties in the past 5-8 quarters by one dollar increases the probability of compliance by 
0.023. For RCRA inspections in the past 5-8 quarters, one more inspection results in an 
increase in the probability of compliance by 0.066. The magnitude of the marginal effects 
for CAA parameters also vary. Increasing CAA penalty by one unit in the past 4 quarters 
increases the RCRC compliance probability by 0.004, and the increment reduces to 0.001 
for one more unit of penalty in the past 5-8 quarters.  At the margin, a unit increase in 
CAA inspection 1 can raise the RCRA compliance probability by 0.177.  
 Other control variables included in the compliance equations seems to provide 
limited effects. The only significant variable is TRIS, which indicates whether a facility is 
subject to TRI. Facilities regulated under TRI are required to report their usage, 
manufacturing, transportation or releases of certain toxic chemicals to state and local 
governments. Previous empirical analyses of information disclosure programs can be 
used to explain this positive effect of TRIS. For example, Konar and Cohen (1997) show 
that firms with stock prices declining due to the release of the TRI information 
subsequently reduce their emissions by a larger amount than other firms in the same 
industry. Thus, facilities reporting to TRI have more incentive to reduce emissions, 
resulting in better compliance with RCRA. Although several other variables show the 
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expected sign, they are not significant at the 0.10 level. For example, the variables 
generated 2005, managed 2005 and manufacturing are all expected to be negatively 
related with compliance. While these variables show the correct signs in the regression, 
they are not significant at the 0.10 level.  
 Variables related to community characteristics generally do not have significant 
impacts on facility compliance under CAA. This finding is similar to the result in 
Shimshack and Ward (2005), who find community characteristics insignificant in their 
analysis of firm compliance. As explained in their paper, this insignificance is because 
community characteristics impact firm compliance through their influence on 
enforcement, which has been included in the model.   
 
3.6 Conclusion 
 In this paper, I investigate firm compliance behavior under multiple 
environmental regulations. Three possible relationships among compliance decisions are 
considered and tested: 1) complementarity, where regulatory measures under one 
program positively affect firm compliance with other programs; 2) substitution, where 
firms reduce compliance with one program in response to more stringent regulations 
under other programs; 3) independence, where facilities make compliance decisions 
independently. 
 Using data on facilities that are regulated under both CAA and RCRA in 
Michigan, I estimate a probit model with censoring, which yields evidence supporting the 
complementarity of regulations. As expected, RCRA penalties and inspections have 
significantly positive impacts on facility compliance under RCRA. The cross-program 
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effects are positive, such that increases in CAA penalties and inspections also induce 
facilities to comply more often with RCRA. Therefore, the CAA regulatory program has 
positive spillovers on the RCRA program.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  119
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ESSAY 3 REFERENCES 
 
 
  120
A. Alberini, Environmental regulation and substitution between sources of pollution: an 
empirical analysis of Florida's storage tanks, Journal of Regulatory Economics. 19 (2001) 
55–79. 
C. Botre, M. Tosi, F. Mazzei, B. Bocca, F. Petrucci, A. Alimonti, Automotive catalytic 
converters and environmental pollution: role of the platinum group elements in the redox 
reactions and free radicals production, International journal of environment and health, 
1(2007) 142-152.  
M.A. Cohen, Monitoring and enforcement of environmental policy, in: T. Tietenberg, H. 
Folmer (Eds.), International Yearbook of Environmental and Resource Economics, Vol. 
III, Edward Elgar, Northhampton, MA, 1998. 
M. A. Cohen, Empirical research on the deterrent effect of environmental monitoring and 
enforcement, Environmental Law Report, News and Analysis. 30 (2000) 10245–10252. 
S. Konar, M. A. Cohen, Information as regulation: the effect of community right to know 
laws on toxic emissions, Journal of environmental economics and management. 32(1997) 
109-124. 
C. S. Decker, C. R. Pope, Adherence to environmental law: the strategic 
complementarities of compliance decisions, The Quarterly Review of Economics and 
Finance. 45 (2005) 641–661. 
S. Gamper-Rabindran, Did the EPA’s voluntary industrial toxics program reduce 
emissions? A GIS analysis of distributional impacts and by-media analysis of 
substitution, Journal of Environmental Economics and Management. 52(2006) 391–410. 
W. H. Rogers, Regression standard errors in clustered samples, Stata Technical Bulletin. 
13 (1993) 19–23. Reprinted in Stata Technical Bulletin Reprints. 3(1999) 88–94. 
  121
J. P. Shimshack, M.B. Ward, Regulator Reputation, Enforcement, and Environmental 
Compliance, Journal of Environmental Economics and Management. 50 (2005), pp. 519–
540. 
J. P. Shimshack, M. B. Ward, Enforcement and over-compliance, Journal of 
Environmental Economics and Management. 55(1) (2008)  90-105.  
H. Sigman, Cross-media pollution: Responses to restrictions on chlorinated solvent 
releases, Land Economics. 72 (1996) 298–312. 
  122
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ESSAY 3 APPENDICES 
  123
A. The second order effects that are used in deriving the comparative statics include: 
'''
11 2)( mmmmmmmmmmm PfqsaePfqcg −−−+=  
'''
22 2)( nnnnnnnnnnn PfqsaePfqcg −−−+=  
When second order is satisfied,  011 >g  and 022 >g . 
The following are second-order partial derivatives: 
mncg =12  
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The within program effects and their signs are given below, where 02211 >= ggSOC  
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The cross-program effects include: 
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The signs of the cross-program effects depend on the sign of mnc . If 0>mnc , then the 
cross-program effects are negative since the second order cross-partials are negative and 
the Hessian matrix is positive, given that second order condition is satisfied. If 0<mnc , 
then the cross-program effects are positive given that second order condition is satisfied. 
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B.  
Table 3.1 Variable Description and Summary of Statistics 
Variable Description 
Mean 
(Standard deviation) 
RCRA 
compliance =1 if facility is in compliance with RCRA 
0.46 
(0.50) 
RCRA 
inspection 
=1 if facility is inspected in current period 
under RCRA 
0.02 
(0.14) 
RCRA  
inspection 1 
Number of inspections under RCRA, lagged 
one year 
0.15 
(0.74) 
RCRA  
inspection 2 
Number of inspections under RCRA, lagged 
two years 
0.23 
(0.91) 
RCRA penalty 1 
Amount of penalties under RCRA, lagged 
one year, in hundred dollars 
2.23 
(57.36) 
RCRA penalty 2 
Amount of penalties under RCRA, lagged 
two years, in hundred dollars 
2.06 
(56.09) 
CAA inspection 
1 
Number of inspections under CAA, lagged 
one year 
0.16 
(0.43) 
CAA inspection 
2 
Number of inspections under CAA, lagged 
two years 
0.15 
(0.42) 
CAA penalty 1 
Amount of penalties under CAA, lagged 
one year, in hundred dollars 
9.42 
(231.91) 
CAA penalty 2 
Amount of penalties under CAA, lagged 
two years, in hundred dollars 
12.33 
(294.44) 
MACT 
=1 if facility is subject to MACT 
(maximum achievable control technology) 
0.09 
(0.28) 
PSD 
=1 if facility is subject to PSD (prevention 
of significant deterioration) 
0.16 
(0.37) 
NSPS 
=1 if facility is subject to NSPS (new source 
performance standards) 
0.69 
(0.46) 
TRI 
=1 if facility is subject to TRI (Toxic 
Release Inventory) reporting 
0.32 
(0.47) 
NEI 
=1 if facility is in the National Emissions 
Inventory for criteria air pollutants 
0.01 
(0.07) 
NSR 
=1 if facility is subject to NSR (new source 
review) 
0.01 
(0.12) 
CERCLIS =1 if facility is tracked in CERCLIS 
0.03 
(0.17) 
ICIS =1 if facility is tracked in ICIS 
0.23 
(0.42) 
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Table 3.1 continued. 
Variable Description 
Mean 
(Standard deviation) 
Manufacturing 
=1 if facility is classified as manufacturing 
(SIC codes 20-39) 
0.73 
(0.44) 
CEG 
=1 if facility is a RCRA conditionally 
exempt generator 
0.22 
(0.42) 
LQG 
=1 if faciliyt is a RCRA large quantity 
generator 
0.30 
(0.46) 
SQG 
=1 if facility is a RCRA small quantity 
generator 
0.30 
(0.46) 
Generated 2005 
Log of the tons of hazardous waste 
generated in 2005 
-1.53 
(5.65) 
Managed  2005 
Log of the tons of hazardous waste 
managed in 2005 
-6.61 
(7.32) 
Employees 
Number of employees at facility, in 
thousands 
3.15 
(13.21) 
Urban population Total percentage of urban population 
69.77 
(26.02) 
Republican 
Percentage of voters that voted republican 
in 2000 Presidential Election 
48.66 
(10.82) 
Income 
Per capita income in 1999, in thousand 
dollars 
21.40 
(4.11) 
House value 
Median value of specified owner-occupied 
housing units, in thousand dollars 
111.25 
(31.96) 
Manufacturing 
Employed 
Percentage of civilian population 16 years 
and over that are employed in 
manufacturing industries 
23.84 
(5.95) 
Education 
Percentage of population 25 years and over 
with educational attainment 
83.54 
(4.02) 
White population Total percentage of white population 
83.67 
(14.11) 
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Table 92 Estimation results 
Variable RCRA compliance Inspection 
RCRA  
inspection 1 
-0.11 
(0.16) 
0.22* 
(0.05) 
RCRA  
inspection 2 
0.17** 
(0.08)  
RCRA penalty 1 
-0.28 
(0.22)  
RCRA penalty 2 
0.06* 
(0.03)  
CAA inspection 1 
0.47* 
(0.27)  
CAA inspection 2 
-0.09 
(0.29)  
CAA penalty 1 
0.009* 
(0.005)  
CAA penalty 2 
0.003** 
(0.001)  
TRI 
0.57* 
(0.31)  
Urban population 
0.01 
(0.008)  
Republican 
0.01 
(0.01)  
House value 
0.008 
(0.01)  
Education 
0.006 
(0.05)  
Employees 
0.008 
(0.005) 
0.0006 
(0.001) 
Generated 2005 
-0.03 
 (0.06) 
0.002 
(0.009) 
Managed 2005 
-0.08 
(0.05) 
0.02* 
(0.01) 
Manufacturing 
-0.41 
(0.37) 
-0.08 
 (0.07) 
** Significant at the 95% level, * significant at the 90% level. 
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Table 103 Marginal effects 
Variable Marginal effects 
RCRA  inspection 2 0.066 
RCRA penalty 2 0.023 
CAA inspection 1 0.177 
CAA penalty 1 0.004 
CAA penalty 2 0.001 
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